Profitability of Mergers and Acquisitions in Finland before and during the Financial Crisis by Nieminen, Joni
    
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
 
FACULTY OF BUSINESS STUDIES 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joni Nieminen 
 
PROFITABILITY OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN FINLAND 
 BEFORE AND DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Master’s Thesis in Accounting and Finance 
Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vaasa 2015
  
  
1 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS page
  
INTRODUCTION 11 
1.1. Research problem 13 
1.2. Research hypothesis 14 
1.3. The organization of the research thesis 15 
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE: PROFITABILITY OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 17 
2.1. Short-term profitability 17 
2.2. Long-term profitability 20 
 
3. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: OVERVIEW 24 
3.1. Merger Waves 25 
3.2. M&A theories 27 
3.3. Value Increasing Theories 28 
3.3.1. Efficiency theory 28 
3.3.2. Market Power Theory 29 
3.3.3. Corporate Control Theory 30 
3.4. Value Decreasing Theories 31 
3.4.1. Theory of Managerial Hubris 31 
3.4.2. Managerial Discretion 32 
3.4.3. Managerial Entrenchment 33 
3.4.4. Theory of empire building 34 
 
4. MERGER AND ACQUISITION PROCESS 36 
4.1. Premerger phase-critical success factors 37 
4.1.1. Choice and evaluation of the strategic partner 37 
4.1.2. Pay the Right Price 38 
4.1.3. Size Mismatches and Organization 40 
  
  
3 
 
 
4.1.4. Overall Strategy and Accumulated Experience on M&A 41
        4.1.5. Courtship Period 42 
4.1.6. Communication before Merger 43 
4.1.7. Future Compensation Policy 44 
4.1.8. Interrelations between Pre-acquisition Success Factors 45 
4.2. Post-merger Critical Success Factors 46 
4.2.1. Integration Strategies 46 
4.2.2. Post-acquisition Leadership 47 
4.2.3. Speed of Integration 48 
4.2.4. Post-merger Integration Team and Disregard of Day-to-Day Business 
Activities 49 
4.2.5. Communication during Implementation 49 
4.2.6. Managing Corporate and National Cultural Differences 51 
4.2.7. Human Resource Management 51 
4.2.8. Interrelationships between Post-acquisition Critical Success Factors 53 
 
5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 54 
5.1. Data 54 
5.2. Methodology 55 
5.2.1. Methodology for short-term returns 55 
5.2.2. Methodology for long-term returns 58 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 63 
6.1. Short-term profitability 63 
6.2. Long-term profitability 67 
6.2.1. Buy-and-hold returns of the M&A companies 67 
6.2.2. Wealth relatives of the M&A companies 71 
6.2.3. Summary of the long-term results and suggested explanations 80 
6.2.4. Additional tests: structural changes 81 
 
  
 
 
  
5 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 83
REFERENCES 87 
 
LIST OF TABLES        page 
 
TABLE 1. Short-term abnormal returns, pre-crisis period         63 
 
TABLE 2. Short-term abnormal returns, crisis period          64 
 
TABLE 3. Short-term abnormal returns, total period          65 
 
TABLE 4. Difference in profitability between two periods (pre-crisis, crisis)        66 
 
TABLE 5. Pre-crisis period Buy-and-hold returns          68 
 
TABLE 6.  Crisis-period Buy-and-hold returns          69 
 
TABLE 7.  Total period Buy-and-hold returns          70 
 
TABLE 8. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/matching companies        72 
 
TABLE 9. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/market index         73 
 
TABLE 10.  Mean components: M&A companies/matching companies        75 
 
TABLE 11. Mean components of M&A companies/matching companies between two sub-
periods              77 
 
TABLE 12.  Mean components: M&A companies/market index         78 
  
  
 
  
7 
 
 
TABLE 13. Mean components of M&A companies/market index between two sub-
periods             80 
 
LIST OF FIGURES       page 
 
FIGURE 1. Pre-crisis Buy-and-hold returns         68 
 
FIGURE 2. Crisis-period Buy-and-hold returns         69 
 
FIGURE 3.  Total period Buy-and-hold returns         70 
 
FIGURE 4. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/matching companies       72 
 
FIGURE 5. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/market index        73 
 
FIGURE 6. Mean components: M&A companies/matching companies       76 
 
FIGURE 7. Mean components: M&A companies/market index        79 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
9 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Business Studies 
Author:    Joni Nieminen 
Topic of the Thesis: Profitability of Mergers and Ac-
quisitions in Finland before and 
during the financial crisis 
  
Name of the Supervisor:  Jussi Nikkinen 
Degree: Master of Science in Economics 
and Business Administration 
Department:  Accounting and Finance 
Line:  Finance 
Year of Entering the University:  2010 
Year of Completing the Thesis:  2015 Pages: 97 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This research thesis concentrates on evaluating the short- and long-term profitability of 
Finnish companies M&A transactions. Examined full sample period includes the years 
from 2001 to 2010. Total period is also divided into two sub-periods in order to analyze 
the recent Financial Crisis’ impact on the profitability of M&A transactions. General 
statement from previous studies is that mergers and acquisitions are profitable for ac-
quired company’s shareholders but the wealth impacts on the acquirer company’s 
shareholders is however ambiguous. In addition the wealth effects seems to be more 
positive during the short-term but the positive effects seem to vanish after longer exam-
ined period. Previous studies have mainly concentrated on US and UK markets and 
there are not many studies conducted with Finnish data. The purpose of this study is to 
find out whether the mergers and acquisitions are profitable transactions for the share-
holders of the acquiring company. Analysis is conducted for both, short- and long- 
terms and in addition the recent financial crisis is taken into account.  
 
Short-term results are examined with general event study methodology and the statisti-
cal significance of abnormal returns is tested with t-test. Long-term results are examined 
with wealth relative method and finally the volatility adjusted mean components from 
wealth relatives are tested with t-test. General event study methodology is appropriate 
method for short-term studies but in order to avoid the problems which arise from long-
term event studies, this research paper exploits the wealth relative method for long-term 
period analyze.  
 
The results suggest that in the short-term Finnish companies’ M&A transactions have 
even positive impact on shareholders’ wealth. When the examined period is extended 
the wealth impact decrease and finally the M&A transactions seem to generate negative 
returns. In addition the results suggest slight improvement in profitability during the 
crisis period but any of the difference was not statistically significant. 
 
KEYWORDS: mergers and acquisitions, wealth relative, event study, financial crisis  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During challenging times companies try to find out ways to improve their operations. 
Companies are forced to cut out their expenses, layoff work power and generally opti-
mize their operations. Mergers and acquisitions are possible strategic movements during 
hard times and eventually these actions can be profitable and reasonable decisions in 
order to go through challenging market situation. General reasons to conduct mergers 
and acquisitions are related to efficiency-related aims which are meant to create econo-
mies of scale or other benefits from “synergies”. In addition there are motives which 
aim to achieve more market power compared to current situation. More market power is 
beneficial for company during the challenging times and it can ensure that company can 
create stable income despite recession. Finally there are also pure motives toward cost-
effectiveness and benefits from diversification. Cost effectiveness can be reached when 
two entities are combined and operations of two old entities can be done effectively by 
one new entity. Diversification motives are narrowly related to market power issues, 
because diversification enables company to create incomes despite its old core business 
is not doing well. (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford 2001.)  
 
After 2008 when financial crisis really hit to the Europe and the whole World’s econo-
my, it has been challenging to maintain and continue profitable business. Growth of the 
Gross Domestic Product (later GDP) has been slow, investments have decreased and 
unemployment rate has peaked in the European Union area (later EU). Development of 
GDP has been very moderate after 2007 and after strong turmoil period GDP of the EU 
has started to grow again. Finland as a part of the EU has suffered same problems and 
the growth of GPD has been even negative after 2007. Modest development of the 
economy has had impact on investments in Finland and investment activity has declined 
after 2007 (total value of investments around 39 billion in 2007 and 38 billion in 2012). 
(Eurostat 2014; Statistics Finland 2014.) At the same time when total value of invest-
ments has decreased in the EU and in Finland, total value of mergers and acquisitions 
has also declined. Before the crisis, year 2007 was very successful year in M&A opera-
tions and the total value of M&A transactions reached nearly 1800 billion euros in EU. 
That year was the best year since 1999 when total value of M&A transactions reached 
over 1800 billion euros. It is interesting to notice that M&A activity has peaked just 
before the crisis and that’s what happened in 2007 also. After 2007 total value of M&A 
transactions has decreased dramatically and in 2013 M&A transactions totaled just 
around 400 billion euros (Institute of mergers, acquisitions and alliances 2014.)  
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According to represented statistics it can be seen that investment activity and eagerness 
toward mergers and acquisitions have declined during the financial crisis. Campello, 
Graham & Harvey (2010) studied the financial crisis impact on companies’ investment 
decisions and they found out that during the challenging and uncertain times companies 
often postpone their investments. They also noted that problems with external borrow-
ing were one reason why companies had to reject their investments during crisis. 
Bloom, Bond & Reenen (2003) have also studied the investment decision making pro-
cess and they found out that uncertainty of revenues has impact on investment deci-
sions. These findings are aligned with represented statistics that during the crisis and 
uncertain time companies are more cautious to make significant investment decisions 
like mergers and acquisitions. Fortunately recent survey from European Central Bank 
(2014) reports that only small percentage of European companies have suffered turno-
ver reduction in the beginning of 2014. European Central Bank report also states that 
availability of external financing has improved during 2014. These findings create posi-
tive sights for future merger and acquisition operations.  
 
In addition with motives concerning firm performance and effectiveness there is also 
other important reason why companies should make investments. Investments can ena-
ble that firms perform well in the future also but all the investments are not acceptable 
from the point of view of finance theory. General theory, according to Modigliani & 
Miller (1958), states that companies should only make investments which create value 
for shareholders and maximize value creation of the company. This aspect of compa-
nies’ investments is significant since mergers and acquisitions as investments should be 
operations which create value for shareholders.  
 
Profitability and value creation of mergers and acquisitions has been the topic of many 
studies. Jensen (1988) studied the consequences of takeovers, which were conducted by 
USA companies during the period 1981-1984. Takeovers, mergers and acquisitions all 
are operations which change the corporate control and hence they have significant im-
pact on related companies. According to Jensen (1988), shareholders of the target firm 
benefit from takeovers. Impact on acquiring-firm is however slightly opposite, because 
shareholders of the acquiring-firm earn only small or even zero returns. In the light of 
these findings it is at least ambiguous how beneficial mergers and acquisitions are for 
shareholders. However there are also contradictory findings in M&A studies which state 
that mergers and acquisitions are beneficial for both, shareholders of the target and ac-
quiring companies. Barber & Lyon (1997) have studied value creation of these opera-
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tions and they stated that results are strongly dependent on the methodology that is used 
to measure returns.  
 
Although mergers and acquisitions have been popular topics of research, there are not 
many studies concerning Finnish companies and their mergers and acquisitions. Previ-
ous studies concerning Finnish companies’ M&A transactions are related motives be-
hind M&A transactions (Lehto 2006), innovations impacts on M&A operations (Lehto 
& Lehtoranta 2006) and legitimation strategies related to M&S transactions in Finnish 
Pulp and Paper Fiction (Vaara 2006). In addition there is at least one study related to 
profitability of Finnish companies’ M&A transactions. Koskinen (2010) studied how 
Finnish companies performed in the long-run after they had taken part in mergers and 
acquisitions. Lack of the studies related to profitability of Finnish companies’ M&A 
transactions is one of the primary reasons for doing this research.  
 
During stable economic times companies have more liquidity and they are able to create 
cash surplus. On the other hand during recession or economic downturn sales decrease 
and it is harder for companies to create surplus. Good liquidity may have also some in-
fluence on investment decision that companies make, because during good times com-
panies don’t face so tough financial constraints. Vogt (1994) studied the relationship 
between cash flow and capital investment spending and he found out that there is some 
relationship between extra cash flows and unprofitable investment decisions. This 
would imply that when companies don’t have extra cash flow they must think accurate-
ly how profitable investments they will conduct. These issues construct another motive 
for this study because it would be interesting to find out whether Finnish companies 
have done more profitable mergers and acquisitions during crisis than before.  
 
 
1.1. Research problem 
 
The primary purpose of this study is to find out whether the mergers & acquisitions of 
Finnish companies are profitable for shareholders or not. In order to get as comprehen-
sive picture as possible, profitability is measured for both short- and long-term. Differ-
ence with previous studies, this research paper will use alternative method which is 
based on wealth relative method. Using of wealth relative method for analyzing mergers 
and acquisitions’ returns should removes the possible bias problem of the right-skewed 
distribution, survivorship bias and problems of re-balancing. 
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Secondly, putting some interest on recent recession and crisis this study tries to find out 
whether there is difference in profitability of the Finnish companies M&A transactions 
before the crisis and during the crisis. Financial crisis is the background of many recent 
studies but the investment profitability and M&A transactions are not that popular yet. 
Motive behind this approach is that during the more stable times and times with extra 
cash flows companies may take part in investments which are not as profitable as possi-
ble.  
 
There are already many studies concerning the profitability of mergers and acquisitions 
in the field on finance studies. Many of these studies however have been made with US, 
UK or with some other wide landscape data. Generally these studies have tried to find 
out the mergers and acquisitions’ impact on shareholders wealth in short- or long-term. 
Using the database from for example US has some benefits compared to smaller data-
bases and one example relates purely on methodology issues. General approach to 
measure M&A transactions’ profitability in the long-term is to compare returns of mer-
gers with some benchmark portfolio, which includes companies with similar character-
istics but they have not taken part in mergers or acquisitions. This benchmark approach 
is not that easy to use with small data like Finnish stock exchange and probably that is 
the one reason why there are quite few studies concerning Finnish companies’ transac-
tions.  
 
 
1.2. Research hypotheses 
 
Profitability of mergers and acquisitions has been popular topic in finance research. 
Many studies have tried to find out whether mergers and acquisitions are wealth de-
creasing or increasing events and results have been quite diversified. According to pre-
vious studies from Carper (1990), Loderer & Martin (1992), Martynova, Oosting & 
Renneboog (2006), and Shantanu & Vijay (2009) mergers and acquisitions did not re-
sult any significant abnormal returns. On the other hand Corhay & Alireza (2000) and 
Kiymaz (2003) result that mergers and acquisitions generally have positive effect on 
shareholders wealth. However there are also opposite findings and for example Lim-
mack (1991) found out that mergers and acquisitions are wealth decreasing operations 
for acquirers and wealth increasing operations for targets. These previous studies would 
imply that generally mergers and acquisitions are not wealth increasing neither wealth 
decreasing actions. One study from Jakobsen & Voetman (2003) has put some interest 
on used methodologies to measure abnormal returns from M&A transactions and first of 
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all they found out that mergers and acquisitions did not result any significant negative 
or positive returns and secondly they pointed out that earlier findings which result sig-
nificant abnormal returns may suffer from methodological bias.  
 
In the light of these earlier results the first hypothesis of this paper is following: 
 
H1: Mergers and acquisitions did not create any significant abnormal returns for 
shareholders, not in short- and neither in the long-run.  
 
Second hypothesis tests the value creative effect of investments and its change during 
different economical periods. As stated earlier according to Modigliani & Miller (1958) 
investment decisions should lead to value creative activities. However many studies 
have stated that there is significant contradiction between management decisions and 
wealth effect for shareholders. At least Jensen (1986), Jensen (1988) and Vogt (1994) 
have noted that during extra free cash-flow, management is more eager to make invest-
ments and always these investments decisions are not value creative for shareholders. 
These findings create a background for second hypothesis. In addition recent findings 
from Campello, Giambona, Graham & Campbell (2011) and Campbello, Graham & 
Harvey (2010) have concluded that companies have been forced to postpone their in-
vestments during crisis and because of lack of finance. Conclusion from these studies is 
that during more stable times companies can make more investments but when compa-
nies have more free cash flow for making investments, results are not always value 
creative for stockholders. However the Modigliani & Miller’s (1958) statement should 
be the base of every investment and hence the investments should always have wealth 
increasing impact on shareholders. Hence the second hypothesis is summarized follow-
ing way: 
 
H2: There is no difference in profitability of mergers and acquisitions before and during 
the crisis.  
 
 
1.3. The organization of the research thesis 
 
The purpose of this study is to finds out whether mergers and acquisitions of Finnish 
companies increase the wealth of firms’ shareholders or not. In addition second goal is 
to solve whether there is difference in profitability of Finnish companies’ M&A transac-
tions before and during the crisis. Chapter 1 represents some statistics and evidence re-
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lated to topic and also motivates the research problem and introduces the hypotheses. 
Previous literature related to topic is introduced in chapter 2. Chapter 3 goes through the 
general theories related to M&A transactions. Merger and acquisition process and the 
most critical factors of this process are introduced and analyzed in the chapter 4. Data 
and methodology issues are represented in Chapter 5. In chapter 6 empirical tests with 
represented data and methodology is conducted. Finally conclusions of the study are 
reported in the chapter 7.   
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2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE: PROFITABILITY OF MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
Previous literature concerning value creation of mergers and acquisitions is at least am-
biguous. Results from previous studies vary between negative impacts to positive and 
some studies have reported the zero effect. The main motive behind this study is to find 
out whether the mergers and acquisitions of the Finnish companies had positive or nega-
tive impact on shareholders’ wealth. Because investigation is made for both short- and 
long-term period, also the previous literature for both two time periods will be covered.   
 
 
2.1. Short-term profitability 
 
Anju (1990) has studied the value creation of mergers and acquisition and the possible 
performance differences between transactions of the related and unrelated companies. 
Data were collected from U.S. companies and the study was conducted by using general 
event-study method. Realized returns after announcement were compared with expected 
returns, which were estimated from market model. Expected returns were estimated by 
combining returns of both firms and then handling them like a one entity. So basically 
imagined portfolio of two companies was constructed and then expected returns for 
post-acquisition period were estimated. Study included 104 tender offers in which 51 
were classified as unrelated transactions and 53 as related ones. As a measure of per-
formance the study used synergy score and average cumulative abnormal return. Syner-
gy score was calculated by comparing actual and expected values and abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns were calculated by comparing actual and expected returns 
of companies. According to results, mergers and acquisitions were value creative trans-
actions. Z-statistics for both value measures were significant. Conclusions were that 
mergers and acquisitions had wealth increasing effect, there was no significant profita-
bility difference between related and unrelated M&As, and synergistic gains and profit-
ability were better in bigger transactions.   
 
Limmack (1991) studied the wealth effects of mergers with UK company data. Investi-
gated period was 1977-1986 and the final data set included 529 bidders and 552 targets. 
Method used was also event-study method and there were two event days, announce-
ment day and the outcome day. Outcome day is the day when the deal is first time con-
sidered as accepted or abandoned. For wealth effect measurements the study uses three 
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different measurements: market model developed by Fama; Fisher, Jensen and Roll, 
adjusted beta model and index model. Market model is a general model where alphas 
and betas are estimated from earlier security returns and the expected return is the sum 
of alpha and multiplier from beta and market return. Infrequent trading of certain securi-
ties lead in biased estimators of alpha and beta and hence Limmack decided to use the 
adjusted beta model also. The third method, Index Model, is a model which assumes 
that alphas are zero and betas are one for all securities. By using these methods for cal-
culating the returns, conclusion is that during pre-merger period both bidder and target 
earn positive returns. Positive abnormal returns for target are aligned with other previ-
ous studies but positive abnormal return for bidder is surprising. Limmack has noted 
that positive abnormal returns in pre-merger period can be caused by two explanations: 
whether information about merger has leaked before announcement or the bidder has 
performed exceptionally well during the announcement. In contrast bidder firms earn 
negative abnormal returns and targets positive abnormal returns during the post-merger 
period. In addition Limmack has tested the wealth effects of mergers and in conclusion 
the wealth of bidder company’s shareholders decreases at the same time when the 
wealth of target company’s shareholder increases. Results indicate that at least mergers 
are not value reducing transactions but wealth transfers between parties is unbalanced.   
 
Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) have also studied the wealth effects of mergers 
with UK data. The method they used was also event-study and the returns were estimat-
ed by using normal market model, the market model with a correction for thin trading 
and in addition market adjusted model in which alpha is considered to be zero and beta 
one respectively. The returns from these three different calculations were finally cumu-
lated in cumulative average abnormal returns and the statistical significance of the re-
sults was tested with t-test. Totally their study included 429 takeover bids and the ob-
servations were from years 1980 to 1990. Main agenda with wealth effects was try to 
find out which factors influence most on the wealth creation. That is why the regression 
model of the study included different ownership and synergy variables. Conclusion 
from the study is that financial synergy seems to dominate operational synergy, combin-
ing companies with complementary fit in terms of liquidity slack and surplus invest-
ment opportunities is value creative for firms’ shareholders, and when highly rated firm 
acquirers less highly rated firm, the acquiring firm’s shareholders experience wealth 
loss and target firm’s shareholders experience wealth gains. In addition large sharehold-
ings decrease the returns of the shareholders of both companies. Finally equity offers 
seems to generate smaller wealth gains compared with cash or mixed payment methods.  
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Compared with above represented studies, study by Goergen (2004) has analyzed the 
shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeovers. His study 
is large-scale study which includes totally 187 mergers and acquisitions of European 
firms. Data was collected from years 1993 to 2000 and the requirement was that both, 
acquiring and acquired, companies must be European. From 187 transactions 118 were 
classified as domestic and 69 as cross-border. In addition data sample included just 
transactions which value were minimum USD 100 million. As a methodology Goergen 
has used the general event-study method. Betas for future expected returns are calculat-
ed by six different ways: market model, market model where estimation period is closer 
the event day, Datastream betas which were corrected for mean-reversion, betas cor-
rected for mean-reversion and calculated by Merril Lynch method, betas corrected for 
mean-reversion using a Bayesian method where degree of adjustments depends of the 
sampling error of the beta, and Dimson beta which corrects thin trading bias of the be-
tas. As a result from various tests Goergen states that selection of beta has no significant 
impact on results so he ended up to use Dimson betas which are corrected for thin trad-
ing bias. Finally realized returns were compared with estimated returns in order to get 
cumulative average abnormal returns of the firms. Significance of CAARs was tested by 
standard significance test. In conclusion Goergen states that target firms earned signifi-
cant positive returns (9% during announcement and even 23% return over two month 
period). In contrast the returns for acquiring firms’ shareholder were only 0.7%. Type of 
the transaction had also impact on profitability, because hostile takeovers were very 
profitable for targets but value decreasing for acquiring firms’ shareholders. In addition 
method of payment seemed also to have impact on returns, because transactions paid by 
cash very more profitable than transactions which were paid by equity or mix of cash 
and equity. Final statement is that domestic transactions earned higher return than for-
eign. In the light of this study the expected conclusion, that takeovers are wealth in-
creasing for targets but nearly zero profitable for acquirers, seems to be correct.  
 
In the light of this study there is an interesting study by Knif and Pape (2014), which 
analyzes the short-term value creation for bidder company’s shareholders in Finland. 
Their data observations are from period 2000-2009 and total amount of transactions that 
they have investigated is 249 takeover announcements. All the acquiring firms were 
Finnish companies. Study sample includes only transactions where the acquiring firm 
acquired over 50% of the target and the total value of the transaction must be over USD 
10 million. USD 10 million value of the transaction seems to be generally used in M&A 
studies. In addition the major part of the target companies were privately owned. Meth-
odology of the study is also the event-study methodology and betas for estimated re-
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turns were calculated by using three different methods: the market model, the adjusted 
market model, and the market model where betas were adjusted for mean-reversion. 
Aligned with previous studies the used beta estimation method had no impact on recog-
nized results. In order to get a clear picture of value drivers Knif and Pape used different 
explanatory variables in their regression. Used variables were the size of the transaction, 
the origin of the target, the legal status of the target, the strategic scope of the transac-
tion, and the mean of payment. Results show that the shareholders of the acquiring 
company earn significant and positive abnormal results during the announcement 
(1.1%). After widening the event-window returns reached about 2%. From 249 takeo-
vers, 156 had positive results and smaller transactions yielded more than bigger ones. In 
addition domestic transactions yielded more than cross-border and transactions between 
unrelated firms performed better than transactions between related firms. As stated, 
these findings are interesting in the light of this study and possible explanation for posi-
tive abnormal returns can be an impact of the sixth merger wave which occurred during 
the investigation period.  
 
 
2.2. Long-term profitability 
 
Long-term wealth gains from mergers and acquisitions have been under the scope of 
many previous studies. Results of the previous studies vary a lot and the primary reason 
of the paper by Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) is to find out whether sharehold-
ers benefit from mergers and acquisitions in the long-run. Data of the study consist of 
1164 transactions from period 1955-1987. All the target companies came from NYSE or 
AMEX exchanges. For examining the abnormal returns, two different methods are used 
in this study. The first method is benchmark portfolio model where merging companies 
are compared with their benchmark portfolio. Benchmark portfolios are constructed 
according to size and beta characteristics. Strength of this model is that the size match-
ing is checked continuously in order to sustain the optimal fit between merging compa-
nies and benchmark portfolios and the betas are calculated for each merging company. 
The second method is called Returns Across Time and Securities (RATS) method and 
here the merging companies are also adjusted for size. Strength of this method is that 
the betas are checked monthly which removes bias possibilities. In addition the accumu-
lated returns from these two models are calculated by using value weighted and equally 
weighted methods. Results from regressions show that long-term wealth gains are sig-
nificantly negative for acquiring companies’ shareholders. Returns are negative in all 1, 
3, and 5 year periods.  Positive returns were obtained only in 44% of the events and the 
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difference between negative and positive returns is significant. In conclusion the share-
holders of the acquiring companies suffer around 10% negative returns from mergers 
and acquisitions in the long-run. These results have faced also some criticism because 
stock returns tend to have mean-reverting characteristic. This might be a problem in 
return estimation but the constantly adjusting betas remove that problem. 
 
Study by Loughran and Vihj (1997) has concentrated on shareholders’ long-term bene-
fits from corporate acquisitions. This study is interesting also in the light of this study 
because the aim of this study is to find out the mergers’ and acquisitions’ impact on 
shareholders’ wealth for both, short- and long-term. Sample of the study includes all the 
mergers and acquisitions which occurred in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ during the 
period 1970-1989. Only transactions which included American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) or closed-end funds were excluded 
from the data. In addition the transactions which included stocks which trading volume 
were less than three dollars per day, were excluded. Totally the sample included 947 
transactions made by 639 firms. All the transactions were also categorized in three 
groups by method of payment: stock payment, cash payment, or some mix of these. In 
order to observe the abnormal results Loughran and Vihj used benchmark method. In-
cluded mergers and transactions were categorized by size and by book-to-market value. 
According to these values every merging firm get a matching firm which acts as a 
benchmark for abnormal returns. After matching firms were selected the regression for 
returns were run annually. Researchers used F-statistics in order to ensure the best pos-
sible matching characteristics between firms. Finally the returns of merging firms were 
calculated in the respect of matching firm and the cumulative average abnormal return 
for five year period was found out. In conclusion, on average acquirer’s stock returns 
were positive and the return from hostile takeovers were greater compared with friendly 
ones. Also the transactions where cash was used as a method of payment result in great-
er wealth increase. Difference between cash transactions and equity transactions was 
significant. In the light of the results, the shareholders of the acquirer earn positive re-
turns but the owners of target companies did not recognize as encouraging results. Dur-
ing the announcement period target firms’ shareholders earned positive results but that 
wealth increase seemed to diminish during longer period. Results are encouraging for 
acquiring firms’ shareholders but the benchmark method is the possible source of bias, 
because finding matching firm is not always evident.  
 
Research of mergers and acquisitions has earlier concentrated much on U.S. markets 
and hence it is interesting to get research from other countries also. Study by Andre, 
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Kooli and L’Her (2004) concentrates on Canadian market and the long-run performance 
of Canadian merging firms. Their study data include 267 Canadian companies’ M&As 
from period 1980-2000. All the transactions under the scope had transaction value over 
USD10 million. Major part of the transactions (92.5%) were classified as friendly ones. 
44.5% of the transactions were paid by cash, 20.6% were paid by equity, and the rest 
were mixed payments. Almost one-third of the included transactions were cross-border 
ones and around 75% were transactions between related industries. The analyzed sam-
ple can be said to be quite comprehensive. For measuring the returns, researchers used 
calendar-time method which according to Fama’s suggestions is less subject to “the bad 
model problem”. This method allows researchers to examine the cross-correlations be-
tween the firms in the sample, and allows better statistical inference of returns. In order 
to find abnormal returns there are used two methods in the study: Fama and French 
three-factor-model and mean calendar-time abnormal returns-method. The alphas from 
these two methods are used in the examination of the long-term effects. Abnormal re-
turns are recognized finally from the difference between merger companies and bench-
mark companies. The valid benchmark companies are found by size and book-to-market 
characteristics. In conclusion, the companies which merged during the examined period 
underperformed compared with benchmark companies in the long-run. In addition 
glamour (book-to-market is low) firms underperformed compared with value (book-to-
market is high) firms. Also the transactions paid by equity proved to underperform 
compared with transactions paid by cash and the cross-border transactions seemed to be 
underperforming transactions.   
 
Recent study from Koskinen (2010) concerns the long-term performance of Finnish 
companies’ mergers and acquisitions. The study is very interesting in the light of this 
study because the examined market and part of the methods are similar. Koskinen ex-
amined 117 Finnish firms’ acquisitions during the period of 1995-2006. Study is con-
ducted by using event-study methodology and abnormal returns are observed from mar-
ket model. As a conclusion study has found out that the shareholders of the merging 
Finnish companies suffer major wealth loss. Wealth losses were over 70% for multiple 
bidders and over 50% for single bidders. These wealth reductions are significant and 
even exceptionally high compared with other studies. One explanation for huge wealth 
loss is “peripheria” syndrome which is caused by thinly traded market like Finland. 
High variation in stock returns during the downturns is seemed to exist especially in 
thinly traded markets. In addition study has concluded that despite major part of the 
companies underperformed, the glamour firms underperformed more than value firms. 
Also the method of payment seemed to have impact on performance because equity 
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transactions underperformed cash transactions and big acquirers did not underperform 
as poorly as small and median size firms.    
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3. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: OVERVIEW 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are corporate control transactions which often include also 
significant restructurings of organization. These transactions have huge impact on or-
ganizations and their stakeholders like managers, employees, suppliers, customers and 
even residents of surrounding communities. In general literature all the transactions 
which lead to the corporate control changes and restructurings of organization are spo-
ken as mergers and acquisitions. However there is small difference in exact definitions. 
Mergers are transactions where two entities combine and after that they continue busi-
ness by one entity. Acquisitions on the other hand are transactions where one entity 
could purchase another and they can continue business by one entity or the acquired 
company can be subsidiary of the acquirer. As said, in general both of these transactions 
are spoken together and their common nomination is mergers and acquisitions. (Jensen 
1988.) 
 
Depending on the target and the reason for transaction, mergers and acquisitions can be 
categorized at least in three main groups. First two categories are horizontal and vertical 
M&As and in the literature they are named as “traditional” M&A transactions. In hori-
zontal transaction merger occurs between direct competitors and in contrast vertical 
transaction merger occurs between buyer-and-seller relationships. In finance theory 
some specific goals are linked to these different types of M&A transactions. Horizontal 
and vertical mergers are more likely expected to yield operating synergies such as econ-
omies of scale. The third category is called as conglomerate mergers. Product extension 
is one example from conglomerate merger. Product merger occurs without direct com-
petition but functional or distributional relation can exist. In addition conglomerate 
merger could refer to transaction where two companies from different geographical re-
gions combine. In conclusion conglomerate merger is a term for merger transactions 
when there is no significant connection between companies before the merger. Con-
glomerate mergers are often expected to yield some financial synergies like different 
price-earnings multiples or different financial leverage. (Melicher & Hempel 1971.) 
 
Organizational restructurings like mergers and acquisitions have significant impact on 
corporate control also. M&A transactions have substantial impact on ownership struc-
ture and the way how ownership transfers between old and new owners can be one way 
to categorize these M&A transactions. In general, merger and acquisition transactions 
are either friendly or hostile and the way how and to whom the acquirer makes the offer 
defines which type particular transaction is. Friendly transaction occurs when acquirer 
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negotiates first with incumbent management and after based on negotiations offer is 
approved by management and shareholders. In contrast hostile transaction occurs when 
acquirer makes the offer directly to shareholder of the target company, without negotiat-
ing the incumbent management. Previous studies have suggested that hostile transac-
tions are not very attractive neither profitable because acquirer must often pay high 
premium to shareholders. In addition hostile takeovers include quite significant addi-
tional costs from high cost services of merchant banks and lawyers. On the other hand 
there are some questionable aspects in friendly takeovers too. Separation of ownership 
may create agency problem between management and shareholders. In takeover transac-
tions management may act unfavorable way even if the transaction could be profitable 
for shareholders. Reason for this is that management does not want to lose its power and 
position which could happen by takeover. (Schnitzer 1996.)  
 
Takeovers are huge transactions and just before the crisis really hit the economy, value 
of worldwide transactions reached nearly 5000 billion U.S. dollars (imaa 2014). Due to 
significant financial impact acquirers must think properly how they will finance coming 
transaction. In general, acquirers have two options for financing: equity or debt based. 
Martynova (2009) has studied the financing decision impact on the value creation of 
takeover. She states that financing decision is influenced by the bidder´s pecking order 
preferences, acquirer’s growth sights, and acquirer’s corporate government environ-
ment. Financing method is also strictly aligned with bidder’s strategic preferences. Ac-
cording to Martynova’s research, takeovers financed by debt outperform transactions 
financed by internally generated funds. Results of the Martynova’s research are interest-
ing also in the scope of this paper because during the upswing, firms have more cash 
flow surplus but the transactions financed by this surplus may not be as profitable com-
pared with recession period when firm’s may be forced to finance their transactions 
with more debt. Profitability differences of the takeovers between different economic 
cycles will be considered later in this paper.  
 
 
3.1. Merger Waves 
 
It is proved fact that mergers tend to occur in waves. Academic literature has approved 
at least five different merger waves during the last century. In addition the sixth merger 
wave started after dot.com bubble burst, around year 2001 and it peaked just before fi-
nancial crisis really hit in year 2007. Takeover wave is recognized when number of 
transactions and value of transactions are significantly high. Earlier merger waves oc-
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curred in early 1900s, in 1920s, in 1960s, in 1980s and in 1990s. Every wave has some 
certain characteristics and the reason for start and end of every wave is kind unique. 
Every wave typically has started during some economic, political or regulatory changes. 
Interesting fact about merger waves is that first waves occurred almost only in U.S but 
the fifth merger wave in 1990s is considered as a first real international wave. 
(Martynova & Rennebook 2008.) 
 
The first wave occurred in the beginning of 20
th
 century. Typical for that period were 
radical changes in technology, economic expansion and innovation in industrial pro-
cesses, the introduction of new state legislation on corporations, and the development of 
trading in industrial stock in NYSE. The characteristic feature for this first wave was 
horizontal consolidation and monopolization. Monopolization and horizontal concentra-
tion increased merged firms’ market power. The first wave ended around 1905 and the 
reason for the end was the crash of equity markets.  
 
The Second merger wave took place between years 1910 and 1920. If it was typical 
characteristic for the first wave that firms aimed to form monopolies in contrast typical 
for second wave was that firms aimed to form oligopolies. Smaller companies which 
were left out from monopolies of the first wave formed oligopolies and by these actions 
they tried to achieve economies of scale and increase power to fight against dominant 
firms. Appropriate reasons for this oligopoly centered wave were that dominant firm did 
not try to expand more because the lack of capital and better enforcement of antimo-
nopoly law. This second wave ended in the crash of stock market. (Martynova & 
Rennebook 2008.) 
 
After the second wave it took quite many years before the next wave emerged. However 
the third wave took off in the 1950s and last until the end of 1960s. Important issues for 
the third wave were the tightening of the anti-trust regime in 1950. Certain characteristic 
for the third wave was a significant amount of conglomerate mergers. By conglomer-
ates, firms aimed to achieve benefit from growth opportunities in new product markets 
unrelated to their core business. Conglomerate mergers enabled them to enhance value, 
reduce their earnings volatility and hedge from the imperfections in external capital 
markets. The oil crisis in the beginning of 1970s was the end of the third merger wave. 
(Martynova & Rennebook 2008.) 
 
The fourth wave started around 1980 when stock market had recovered from recession. 
Important factors which had impact on this fourth wave were changes in anti-trust poli-
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cy, the deregulation of financial services sector, the creation of new financial instru-
ments and markets, as well as technological progress in the electronics industry. Signif-
icant issue for this fourth merger was a huge number of divestitures, hostile takeovers 
and going-private transactions. Motive behind these actions were inefficiency of con-
glomerates formed in the previous wave. The fourth merger wave faced its end also 
because of stock market crash. (Martynova & Rennebook 2008.) 
 
In the beginning of 1990s took place fifth merger wave and it is called the first interna-
tional wave. Compared to earlier waves the size of European takeover market was about 
as large as its US counterpart. In addition Asian takeover market started to grow during 
that fifth wave. Significant factors influencing on the fifth wave were increasing eco-
nomic globalization, technological innovation, deregulation and privatization as well as 
the economic financial markets boom. Specific characteristic for this fifth wave was a 
huge number of cross-border transactions. Previously domestically-oriented firms ex-
panded abroad in order to survive in tough international competition. The fifth wave 
ended also due to stock market crash in the beginning of 21
st
 century. (Martynova & 
Rennebook 2008.) 
 
The latest merger wave started after stock markets recovered from dot.com bubble 
crash. Firms continued the globalization projects through mergers and acquisitions. Ex-
cess financing by debt and recovering stock markets supported this sixth wave. Unfor-
tunately bloomed wave faced its end in 2007 when financial crisis hit to the economy. 
(Martynova & Rennebook 2008; Gugler, Mueller, Weichselbaumer & Yurtoglu 2012.) 
 
 
3.2. M&A theories 
 
Before running the regressions for the data and analyzing the results, the basic theories 
related to mergers and acquisitions must be covered. Because mergers and acquisitions 
are driven by different motives, also different theories must be analyzed in order to get a 
clear picture why companies merge. These theories help analyzing the results and with 
theoretical background it is easier to conclude why certain issues occur. For theoretical 
framework this study will use the same categorization as Weitzel (2011) has used in his 
paper. Weitzel has grouped M&A theories in two groups: value increasing theories and 
value decreasing theories. Theories which are grouped are efficiency theory, market 
power theory, corporate control theory, hubris theory, managerial discretion theory, 
entrenchment theory and empire building theory. First three are value increasing theo-
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ries and the rest are value decreasing theories. These two categories and seven different 
theories will be presented next.  
 
 
3.3. Value Increasing Theories 
 
3.3.1. Efficiency theory 
  
Motive for merger according to value increasing theories is that merger will be benefi-
cial for both the acquirer and the acquired company. This is strictly aligned with basic 
idea behind finance theory that firm’s most important goal is to increase the value of its 
shareholders. Efficiency theory suggests that merger will increase company’s and its 
shareholders’ wealth through operative synergies. Main point in efficiency is that com-
bination of two entities can perform more efficiently because for example the admin-
istration of the new entity can be handled by one entity’s workforce. In general the idea 
is that one plus one is more than two in the case of synergies of efficient. (Weitzel 
2011.) Efficiency theory also supports the idea that poorly working firm led by poor 
management is very likely to be purchased and hence the efficiency of old firm will be 
improved through merger and by new owner (Scherer 1988). 
 
Because mergers and acquisitions are multidimensional transactions, source of wealth 
creation is not always easy to find out. Expected efficiency increase of the combined 
entity is one very likely reason for value increase but alternative suggestions are for 
example increased power through monopoly power and even market mispricing. These 
mentioned aspects are studied by Banerjee & Eckard (1998) and they concluded that 
expected efficiency related outcomes were the primary source of value creation after 
merger. They rejected the monopoly power alternative because they did not find any 
“free-rider” reaction which is typical in monopoly behavior. They neither found any 
support for market mispricing alternative. Supporting evidence for efficiency theory can 
be found from study by Avkiran (1999). According to their study inefficient banks were 
more likely to become merged. Their conclusions support the theory that efficiency in-
crease is the main motive for merger.  In addition studies by Devos, Kadapakkam & 
Krishnamurthy (2009) and Mukherjee, Kiymaz & Baker (2004) support the efficiency 
related theory. Primary source of effectivity according to these studies is cost cuttings. 
Savings of expenditures are considered more important source of effectivity than even 
increased revenues.  
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3.3.2. Market Power Theory 
 
Market power theory is another explanation why mergers increase shareholders’ and 
other stakeholders’ value. Primary target of the benefits are however shareholders. If 
efficiency theory suggested that wealth increases by more cost effective organization, 
market power theory suggests that wealth increase comes from higher prices. Higher 
prices are wealth transfers from customers and it is possible because increased market 
power enables firms to ask higher prices. Wealth link in market power theory is also 
synergies and these synergies are results from increased market power. (Weitzel 2011.) 
 
Horizontal mergers and acquisitions are proved to increase market concentration at least 
in some level. In the light of market power theory, concentration of the market leads to 
higher prices and hence the increased market power is the primary source of wealth 
gains. Market power gains and benefits from more concentrated markets get support 
from the study by Prager (1992). Prager investigated railroad industry in the U.S. and 
his conclusions support market power theory but diversification and antitrust enforce-
ments have impact on wealth gains. Empirical support for market power theory and the 
significant role of market concentration can be found also from study by Kim and 
Singal (1993). Their study investigated mergers’ effects in airline industry and accord-
ing to their findings mergers had positive impact on shareholders wealth and the prima-
ry source of wealth gains was higher prices. Interesting finding was also that poorly 
performing firms ask lower prices but after merger they rose their fares and it helped 
them to perform more profitable. That is quite genuine but it supports the theory that 
mergers lead to market power and it enables asking of higher prices. 
 
In contrast with horizontal mergers, market power theory can be applied with vertical 
mergers also. According to empirical evidence market power theory explains the mer-
gers and acquisitions when target company is operating in relatively competitive mar-
kets. On the other hand firms already operating in highly concentrated industries do not 
have significant incentives to take part in mergers and acquisitions. In conclusion the 
concentrated market position is one strategic goal of firms and mergers are considered 
as an appropriate alternative for achieve it. (Chatterjee 1991).  
 
Market power hypothesis seems to be strongly related to the size of the acquirer, be-
cause empirical evidences state for example that big banks which acquire, achieve more 
market power. Conclusion is that the larger mergers result in higher interest rates. In-
creased market power enables banks to ask higher interest rates similar to increased 
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market power enables firms from other industries ask higher prices (Sapienza 2002). 
Significance of size of the acquiring firm is considered also in the study from Chatterjee 
(1991) and the conclusion is that bigger acquirer results in bigger gains in market pow-
er. In addition Chatterjee however states that market power theory and efficient theory 
must be considered simultaneously sometimes and motives must be investigated case by 
case.  
 
3.3.3. Corporate Control Theory 
 
The third theory in the group of value increasing theories is corporate control theory. 
According to this theory the management’s primary task is to run the firm so that the 
wealth of shareholders will be maximized. If management and company underperform 
there will always be eager firms to purchase this underperforming firm. In a result of 
merger this poorly operating management will be replaced and firm will start maximize 
shareholders’ wealth again. Corporate control theory includes some kind of circular 
effect where new management will maximize firm’s profit until there emerge new firm 
and management which is able to earn even higher profits with firm’s assets. Corporate 
control theory is slightly related to efficient theory but significant differences arise at 
least in two issues. First, value increasing is not a result of combined assets of two firms 
but the acquirer firm’s management and underutilized assets of acquired firm. Second, 
corporate control theory often includes hostile takeovers because incumbent manage-
ment is likely to resist the takeover. Typically bidders in these occasions are private 
investors or corporate riders which will bring in more sufficient management teams. In 
conclusion shareholders’ wealth is increased by net gains through managerial synergies. 
(Weitzel 2011.) 
 
Market power theory has been criticized by many authors and lawyers that mergers are 
harmful for society and customers because of risen prices. In contrast with this approach 
Manne (1965) has concluded that merger markets are important part of the markets be-
cause profitable assets of the poorly managed organizations must be fully utilized and 
here markets for mergers are important. From economical point well-functioning firms 
are beneficial for the whole society. However if organization’s assets are not utilized 
fully because of poor management, the firm does not increase the wealth in the society. 
According to corporate control theory well-functioning merger markets result in wealth 
increase of the shareholders and the whole society.   
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Supporting evidence for corporate control theory is also suggested by study of Jensen 
and Ruback (1983). According to their findings mergers increase the wealth of share-
holders. They state that previous studies reject the hypotheses that increased market 
power is not the source of wealth gains. Their conclusion is somehow combining result 
of better performing management and increased efficient. According to their study the 
source of wealth increase is not explicitly the new management or cost effectiveness but 
the combination where competent management enables the firm to be profitable and 
efficient in the future.  
 
 
3.4. Value Decreasing Theories 
 
3.4.1. Theory of Managerial Hubris 
 
Theory of managerial hubris suggests that mergers result in value decrease of share-
holders and the primary reason is bad bids made by acquirer’s management. In hubris 
theory, management of the acquirer suffers from bounded rationality and they end up 
bid too high price for target firm. Result for the company and the shareholders are net 
losses through overpaying. Overpaying often leads firms in the situation which is called 
the “winners curse”. “Winners curse” is a phenomenon which often happens in auction 
situations and during the incomplete information. Generally average of the bids is the 
best estimation of right value but because winning bid must be higher than average it 
results in overpaying. (Weitzel 2011.) 
 
Background of managerial hubris theory is that valuation of the target company made 
by bidder’s management is incorrect. Bidder’s management thinks that merger will lead 
a synergy efficiencies and ends up bid too high price for target firm (Roll 1986). Ac-
cording to hubris theory there are no gains from takeovers and takeovers occur just be-
cause acquirer’s management has been too overconfident and made incorrect valuation. 
The result is negative or zero wealth gains for stockholders. (Berkovitch 1993.) 
 
The study from Malmendier (2005) discuss about managerial hubris related problems 
and the success of firm’s investments. According to Malmendier’s study, managers of-
ten overestimate the returns from their investment projects and hence they suffer from 
overconfidence problem. Overconfidence is result from three main factors: the illusion 
of control, a high degree of commitment to good outcomes and abstract reference points 
that make it hard to compare various individuals’ performance. In the light of this study 
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and later discussion, Malmendier has found that managers overinvest during the extra 
free cash-flow but in contrast they cut investments when they would need external funds 
and debt. Because hubris theory suggests that merger is the result of overconfidence and 
misevaluation, the paper by Ming (2006) offers interesting result for this phenomenon. 
According to Ming’s study, main reason for mergers is the aggregate misevaluation of 
investors. Hence it could be concluded that in the light of managerial hubris, managers 
make more often misevaluated than correct decisions.  
 
Hayward & Hambrick (1997) have also studied the managerial hubris theory and they 
have also listed the problem of management overconfidence. However their study con-
cludes that managerial hubris is the result of many simultaneously existing factors. Ac-
cording to their results, managerial hubris is the result of the following factors: recent 
organizational success, media praise for the CEO and weak board vigilance.  
 
Rau & Vermaelen (1998) have found out that there is a profitability difference of mer-
gers between glamour (low book-to-market ratio) and value (high book-to-market ratio) 
firms. In addition with these findings they concluded that management of the acquirer 
and the market over extrapolate the post-performance of the company and hence the 
merger results in value decrease. Markets also show some pessimism towards value 
firms’ management. Hence if management of value firms decides to conduct a merger 
the markets indicates its distrust and the result is wealth decrease of shareholders. 
 
3.4.2. Managerial Discretion  
 
One alternative of value decreasing theory is a theory which is called managerial discre-
tion by Jensen (1986). According to this theory it is not management’s overconfidence 
but rather the extra cash flow which drives the unprofitable mergers and acquisitions. 
Jensen’s theory constitutes from managerial discretion and free cash flow. Its core idea 
is that conflicts of interests between shareholders and management result very often in 
value decreasing takeover decisions. Management with the excess of cash flow is more 
prone to make takeovers and just few of these transactions are value increasing for 
shareholders. According to this theory management with much free cash flow compared 
to management with free cash flow constrains and a high debt financing makes more 
and faster investing decisions which seldom result in profitable transactions.  
 
Conflicting interests and agency problems are named also the main reason for bad take-
over decisions in the paper by Martynova and Rennebook (2009). Booming financial 
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markets or industrial shocks create excessive cash funds for companies. This excessive 
cash flow results in managerial discretion where self-interested managers are prone to 
make empire building investment decisions rather than thinking the wealth increase of 
shareholders. Extra cash flow makes it possible to take part in unprofitable acquisitions 
when profitable ones are already finished. Empirical studies have shown that bidders 
with significant cash flows result in poor post-acquisition profitability. Paper by Marris 
(1963) investigates the growth of the company and management’s incentives. Accord-
ing to his paper managers are very eager to find out growth supporting investments like 
mergers and acquisitions despite better option would be pay out extra money to share-
holders. This explanation is aligned with the core idea from managerial discretion theo-
ry.  
 
Noticeable difference between managerial hubris theory and managerial discretion is 
that according to managerial discretion management makes bad decisions because they 
are less challenged. Surplus of free cash flow does not require managers to pay huge 
attention in their decisions compared with companies with lack of free cash flow surplus 
(Rau & Vermaelen 1998). Successful companies also suffer from management heroistic 
problem where previously competent managers are expected to make good decisions in 
the future also. This problem is partly related in corporate governance issues also (Hay-
ward & Hambrick 1997).  
 
Managers’ self-interested motives are much researched topic in finance and it is proved 
that these motives play role for example in investment decisions. Empirical studies have 
found connection between bidder’s returns and managements’ ownership. Results prove 
that the bigger stake management has in company, the higher are the returns from ac-
quisitions and opposite. These findings are aligned with the theory that management 
evaluates their investment decisions more careful when their own incentives are aligned 
with company. (Weitzel 2011.) 
 
3.4.3. Managerial Entrenchment 
 
According to managerial entrenchment theory, firms merger because taking part in mer-
gers and acquisitions protect their position in the company. This motive behind the 
mergers does not lead to value maximization of the firm but the increased individual 
value of the manager. Result is that replacement of the management will be costly for 
the shareholders and in addition value will be decreased because free resources will be 
invested in manager-specific assets rather than shareholder value-maximizing assets. 
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Firms and shareholders suffer value decrease because of agency cost and differentiated 
interest. Result is value decrease due to poor investments which do not maximize firm’s 
value but reinforce manager’s own position. (Weitzel 2011.) 
 
Investments in long-term assets and other long-term investments like mergers and ac-
quisitions are often transactions which most increase the firm value in the long-run. 
Managerial entrenchment has a contradiction with this idea because managers are in-
voluntary to make significant investment decisions because they fear failure and possi-
ble dismissal. Chakraborty & Sheikh (2010) has investigated the antitakeover amend-
ments impact on investment activity. According to their findings managers avoid to 
make huge investments if their position is in danger. In contrast if there are no antitake-
over amendments, managers are more eager to find profitable investments and hence 
they aim to maximize shareholders’ and firm’s value. In conclusion active and well-
functioning takeover- and CEO-markets can enable value increasing incentives of man-
agement. Aligned findings related to management’s reluctance to take part in invest-
ments when managerial entrenchment exists, is documented in the study by 
Chakraborty, Rzakhanov & Sheikh (2014). Their study concerned management willing-
ness to investment in innovation when antitakeover provisions protected their position. 
In addition also the study by Subramaniam (2001) provides evidence that managerial 
entrenchment creates a conflict of interests between management and shareholders. 
Managerial entrenchment makes management more unwilling toward investments and 
hence the result is shareholders wealth decrease.  
 
3.4.4. Theory of empire building 
 
Theory of empire building includes also conflict of interests and agency costs between 
management and shareholders. According to this theory management is motivated to 
invest in the growth of the firm (revenues or assets) despite the required rate of return is 
not met. Problem rise again from agency based issues and the source of shareholder 
wealth decrease are the acquisitions which do not maximize the shareholders’ and 
firm’s value but grow just the size of the firm. This kind of activity services only the 
goals of the management. (Weitzel 2011.) 
 
Supporting evidence is provided the paper by Marris (1963). According to his findings 
managers are eager to increase the growth of the firm despite the expected profitability 
from all the investments does not full the required rate of return. This kind of action 
leads to wealth decrease of shareholders. Management’s empire building incentives are 
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linked to corporate control problem because when managers are not monitored by 
shareholders they have power to do self-maximizing investments which do not support 
the wealth maximization of shareholders. Managers pursuit just aggressive growth via 
mergers and acquisitions despite their results are value destroying (Hope & Thomas 
2008).   
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4. MERGER AND ACQUISITION PROCESS 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are significant means for expand companies’ operations into 
domestic or international markets. Corporate reconstructing operations enable firms to 
expand their operations within same industry (horizontal transactions), to the next level 
of business (vertical transactions) and even into new business areas (conglomerate 
transactions). Expanding business through mergers and acquisitions is viable alternative 
compared with organic growth operations. Primary reason behind these transactions is 
gaining of synergy benefits. (Berkovitch 1993.) 
 
Corporate reconstructing transactions have undoubtedly significant impact on firms’ 
strategic, monetary and social issues and that’s why these transactions should be evalu-
ated, prepared and implemented properly. Previous literature concerning success of 
these transactions is not however that encouraging, because many studies have resulted 
in underperformance and failure of the M&A transactions. Due to multifactor character-
istic of mergers and acquisitions it is important to evaluate which issues may lead to 
underperforming and failure. The connections between different stages of these transac-
tions must be evaluated in order to get a clear picture why mergers and acquisitions 
failure. (Gomes, Angwin, Weber & Tarba 2013.) 
 
During the next subchapters the critical issues related in success and failure of M&As 
will be discussed. In addition the important connections between these critical points 
will be highlighted. In order to get a clear framework for this analysis, the framework 
by Gomes et.al (2013) will be used. In their study they discuss about these critical issues 
and connections between them. They have divided mergers and acquisitions processes 
in two main stages: pre-merger phase-critical success factors and post-merger phase-
critical success factors. Pre-merger factors include the following phases: choice and 
evaluation of the strategic partner, paying the right price, size mismatches and organiza-
tion, overall strategy and accumulated experience on M&A, courtship, communication 
before merger, and future compensation policy. Post-merger factors in contrast are: in-
tegration strategies, post-acquisition leadership, speed of implementation, post-merger 
integration team and disregard of day-to-day business activities, communication during 
implementation, and managing corporate and national cultural differences.  
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4.1. Premerger phase-critical success factors 
 
4.1.1. Choice and evaluation of the strategic partner 
 
After the firm has evaluated the need for merger and acquisition expanding it must in-
vestigate the potential target properly. Target company’s existing strengths and weak-
nesses must be analyzed well. Potential problems can arise from issues such quality of 
the target firm’s management, cultural differences and human resource related issues 
like top management turnover. In order to achieve successful combination, consolidat-
ing companies should have common organizational and strategic constructs.  (Gomes 
et.al. 2013.) Study by Weber (1996) is aligned with these statements. According to We-
ber’s study, acquiring firms which manage to control the cultural problems and manage 
to take care of possible concerns arising from cultural factors are successful in mergers 
and acquisitions. Paying attention on cultural fit with acquired company is important 
because in the worst case cultural contradictions can have destructive effects. Combin-
ing firms with cultural similarities are likely to reach outperforming results compared 
with companies with disparate cultures. In addition study by Wang & Zajac (2007) has 
investigated the factors which affect how well combining firms fit together. Their start-
ing point is also that firms decide to combine because they share similar strategic goals. 
They states also that cultural issues, target company’s capabilities and environmental 
uncertainty are remarkable factors affecting on eagerness to combine with another com-
pany. In addition with previously listed issues the resource similarity and complementa-
rity, combined rational capabilities and partner-specific knowledge are crucial factors 
which must be evaluated properly before deciding the merger target.  
 
Due diligence is the process where all the earlier presented risks and possible problems 
will be evaluated. Due diligence is a comprehensive analysis of possible target and es-
pecially the fit and risks related to target must be critically analyzed in due diligence 
process. Process starts before the final target company is even decided. Motivation for 
due diligence rises from the acquisition decision and the motivation toward acquisition 
must be well named before finding the target company. (Harvey & Lusch 1998.)  
 
When motive towards acquisition is clear it is easier to start analyze potential targets. 
Due diligence process should start with the industry analysis. Industry assessment 
should provide inputs how to compare companies in industry and how attractive the 
potential industry really is. Industry assessment must include overview about current 
market situation. For example current situation with rivalries, suppliers and customers 
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must be analyzed. In addition industry assessment must provide some support for future 
also. Important issues are for example the future success of certain industry and threat 
of new entrants. Without deep understanding of these factors, merger could turn out be 
very bad decision in later investigation. After analyzing all the potential industries 
where company may expand, they must analyze the potential targets. (Harvey & Lusch 
1998.) 
 
Analysis should be conducted by dividing potential targets into homogenous groups. 
Categorization can be made by size, market share, market(s) served, strategic position-
ing and products served. The classification should give some information which are 
potential successors and which one are likely losers in the future. Due diligence should 
provide so much information and knowledge that during the negotiations acquirer com-
pany is always up to date with current situation. (Harvey & Lusch 1998.) 
 
Third important thing in due diligence is to evaluate the potential fit. Fit relates the ear-
lier mentioned things like cultural and strategic issues but it is also more. Fit includes 
also the comparing of the sizes of two companies, how are the market positions of each 
company and even customer perceptions of the companies. (Harvey & Lusch 1998.) 
 
After the target company is selected the due diligence process must continue. Due dili-
gence must provide the most detailed information about target. Five crucial issues must 
be involved in due diligence after the target company is selected. Due diligence must 
include historical data on various functional components of the target company, deep 
analysis of the quality of each functional area, analysis of key personnel in each func-
tional area, evaluation of how to modify existing systems so that they perform well in 
the future and that they will be integrated properly, and lastly evaluation of certain op-
portunities so that they will be utilized effectively in the future.  Following this proce-
dure acquiring firms can significantly increase their success probability in merges. 
(Harvey & Lusch 1998.) 
 
4.1.2. Pay the Right Price 
 
The final purchase price of the target has a significant role in how successful the corpo-
rate control transaction finally is. Bidding the right price is always challenging task be-
cause of asymmetric information between firms. Information asymmetry exist always at 
least in some level even tough due diligence process is conducted properly. Previous 
research of M&As have stated that very often too high price paid of target is the major 
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reason for transaction failure. If acquiring company pays too much of the target, the 
required return is sometimes very hard to achieve and the result is value decrease by 
transaction. (Gomes et.al. 2013.) 
 
Acquiring companies make different kind of valuations and analysis in order to avoid 
the problem of overpaying. Generally companies use consultants help in the whole 
takeover process and in valuations. Aim of the valuation is to find out the reasonable 
value of the target company and how much the acquiring one should pay in order the 
deal will be satisfactory and successful for both parties. Analysts and consultants which 
help companies in merger process have many different tools for valuation but according 
to study by Demirakos, Strong & Walker (2004) the most used methods in valuation by 
experts are comparatives of different indicators and some alternative of discounted cash 
flow model (DCF). In addition with these methods there are also other popular valua-
tion methods like dividend based models and residual earnings based models. Accord-
ing to survey by Bailey, Brown, Potter and Wells (2008) the residual based model gave 
the most accurate approximation of the value.  
 
Above presented valuation methods are based in available financial data and all other 
possible knowledge that is available in market. As mentioned earlier there still always 
exist asymmetric information problem in some level and that can cause excess costs for 
acquiring company. Shortage of all the crucial information is often the reason for too 
high bidding prices and as Gomes et.al. (2013) have stated, too high premiums are the 
most significant source of takeover failure. Study by Skaife and Wangerin (2013) con-
cerns the problems that low quality of financial reporting can create. Firstly they have 
found that low quality of financial reporting of the target company leads in higher pre-
miums paid in acquisitions. This is aligned with study by Gomes et.al. (2013). Secondly 
they have stated that low quality of reporting is the major source of renegotiations or 
even termination of the deal. According to their findings the termination rate of the 
deals is about 9 percent higher in situations where the target company’s reporting quali-
ty is poor. Thirdly they have found that companies which have problems with low quali-
ty reporting more often use restated financial statements. Restated financial statements 
are not as transparent as official ones and again that increases the information asym-
metry. In the light of these conclusions it can be stated that despite the firms use the 
consultation of experts and even though they use the most sophisticated methods in val-
uation, finally the valuation and finding the right bidding price is someway more rule of 
thumb than the real fact.  
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Purchase of the target can be made by many ways. Transaction can be made by share 
payment, payment by cash or some mix of those. Purchase process can also be classi-
fied as hostile or friendly takeover. Empirical findings states that the type of payment 
and the characteristic of the transaction have impact on merger’s success. Study by 
Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) concludes that hostile takeovers, deals paid by cash and the 
deals which occur in the same industry often lead in positive (or at least not as negative) 
result. Hostile takeovers appear to have important governance role in transactions and 
they seem to lead in deals with companies that own greater wealth potential. However 
hostile takeovers paid by equity seem to lead in worse results. Probable explanation is 
that investors estimate that acquirer’s equity is overvalued before transaction.  
 
4.1.3. Size Mismatches and Organization 
 
Previous studies discussing about size and organizational similarities have found that 
size of the combining organizations and the organizational structure and industry type 
have impact on the success of the takeover process. Results from previous studies state 
that mergers and acquisitions where acquirer is relatively bigger than the target result in 
more poor post-acquisition performance. In contrast an acquisition where bidding com-
pany is smaller than target can result in better performance than average. Generally it 
seems to be trend that smaller firms perform better in mergers and acquisitions. Support 
for this statement can be found from study by Moeller & Schlingemann (2004). Accord-
ing to their study, smaller firms perform better in mergers and acquisitions compared 
with bigger ones. Abnormal returns from small firms’ announcements exceed the ab-
normal returns from big firms’ announcements by 2.24 percentage points. Their conclu-
sion is that no matter what, bigger firms suffer wealth loss almost every time they an-
nounce an acquisition. One reliable explanation for bigger firms’ wealth loss is that they 
offer higher acquisition premiums than smaller ones. Wealth loss in larger deals can 
also be result from managerial attention. Deals which values are relatively small com-
pared with acquirer’s market value can attract too much managers’ attention and then 
the other functions of the acquirer will suffer. In contrast deals which are relatively big 
in relation with acquirer can however raise political in-fighting concerns (Gomes et.al. 
2013).  
 
Empirical studies support the view that the best result will be achieved when both com-
bining firms are balanced and the relatedness of organizations and industries is favora-
ble. Study by Ahuja and Katila (2001) has concluded that larger absolute size and 
smaller relative size of the transaction leads to superior post-acquisition performance. In 
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addition they have stated that relatedness in knowledge base is also key factor for con-
ducting successful acquisition. Conclusions from paper by Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) 
are aligned with earlier findings. According to their study the industrial relatedness is 
positively affected on success of acquisition. In contrast conglomerate mergers and ac-
quisitions seem to result more often in negative returns. Similar findings can be found 
also from paper by Finkelstein and Haleblian (2002). Their study suggests that similari-
ty between acquirer and target increases the likelihood of positive result from merger. In 
contrast dissimilarities between merging companies increases the possibility of negative 
result.  
 
4.1.4. Overall Strategy and Accumulated Experience on M&A 
 
Previous academic research of overall strategy and accumulated experience on M&A 
has stated that firms with more experience from mergers and acquisitions perform better 
with these transactions.  
 
General explanation from previous research is that companies may fail in mergers and 
acquisitions because they lack of continuous and accumulated experience of mergers 
and acquisitions. It is stated that companies with more experience and which follow 
continuous learning approach tend to be more successful in these transactions. (Gomes 
et.al. 2013).  Study by Haleblian (2006) is aligned with these assumptions. His study 
concerns the acquisitions experience on acquisition performance and the main findings 
in his paper are that experience from previous mergers and acquisitions is important and 
in addition actively maintained and updated feedback from these previous transactions 
impact on transactions’ performance. He also states that positive performance from ear-
lier M&As had positive influence on future acquisition activity. The bigger the positive 
image and view from earlier mergers was, bigger was its impact on subsequent activity.  
 
However some studies related to strategy and experience suggests that firms can learn 
and gain knowledge even without taking part in these transactions by themselves. Com-
panies are able to learn by studying other companies’ operations and by means of this 
method they can become well prepared for takeover transactions even without own ex-
perience. (Gomes et.al. 2013).  Study by Delong and Deyoung (2007) supports this view 
of learning and gaining experience through monitoring. Their study concerns the per-
formance of U.S. bank mergers and how investors and firms who didn’t take part in 
these transactions were able to gain knowledge. Their conclusion is that companies who 
were able to observe the best and the worst practices in others’ M&As could improve 
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their own merger performance in the future. In addition companies were able to use this 
knowledge even in predicting the stock markets’ reactions on transaction.  
 
Conclusion from overall strategy and experience is that firms can accumulate their 
knowledge from prior transactions, no matter did they take part in themselves or not. 
Important notions are continuous improvement and maintain of the feedback. In addi-
tion companies which systematically gain their knowledge from one industry and after 
that move forward will success well in future. In contrast the aim to collect knowledge 
simultaneously from many fields will not be as effective. (Zollo & Singh 2004; 
Barkema & Schijven 2008.)  
 
4.1.5. Courtship Period 
 
Before conducting a merger it is crucial for companies to have a “courtship” period. 
Purpose of this period is to deepen the understanding of both parties. This period ena-
bles the companies to know each other better before finishing the transaction. This kind 
of activity can include many kinds of actions and possible actions are for example prior 
formal engagement, such a joint venture, or working on specific projects. Courtship 
period allows both parties to become familiar with other company’s organizational and 
cultural issues, general working habits and explicit and implicit values. Negotiations 
before the exact transaction can reduce the probability of future potential tensions and 
conflicts. (Gomes et.al. 2013.) Sompayrac and Costello (2008) have discussed about 
possible problems and concerns which may arise after the merger is finished. They state 
that proper negotiations and getting familiar with other party can prevent future con-
flicts. Issues which may arise during the “courtship period” are for example: Do both 
companies agree with common goal of the transaction? Does the companies’ organiza-
tional and national culture match with each other? Does the quality of both companies’ 
practices match? What are the possible hidden risks which would relate in transaction?  
 
Courtship period is very good chance to test exactly the match between companies’ cul-
tural issues. Different organizations share different cultures but problems can arise just 
from national culture differences. Study by Barkema and Shcijven (2008) has paid at-
tention to these national cultural differences. According to their findings companies 
which are aware of likely cultural differences will be performed better in takeovers. 
Proper preparations for cultural issues result in better result compared with transactions 
where a random strategy for cultural risks is used. Findigs by Jitao (1991) are aligned 
with these assumptions. His study concerns the mergers and acquisitions in United 
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States and the compared issues are domestic-controlled and foreign-controlled firms. 
His conclusion is that U.S. affiliates whose foreign parents are from culturally different 
countries tend to fail more often than companies whose parents are from culturally simi-
lar countries. This conclusion is aligned with organizational fit issues and exactly this 
kind of problems could be noticed during the courtship period.  
 
4.1.6. Communication before Merger 
 
Communication during merger process has a very big impact on the success of the 
transaction. Both parties in process must put effort in communication, because by 
avoiding employee uncertainty and harmful rumors are in center of project’s success. 
Poorly managed communication can significantly damage the whole process and it can 
increase the lack of confidence within key stakeholders. In the worst case poor commu-
nication can create fear and even dysfunctional actions. (Gomes et.al. 2013.) Study by 
Bastien (1987) has discussed these communication problems and conflicts which may 
arise from the lack of proper communication actions. He has stated that three typical 
concerns relate in M&A transactions and poor communication: personal uncertainty is 
pervasive and must be managed through proper communication management, the indi-
vidual and social processes of coping with this uncertainty involve sudden switches be-
tween opposites (flight-fight, commitment-rejection), rather than gradual change from 
one phase to other, and culture contact and culture shock almost systematically exist in 
mergers and acquisitions. Almost all individuals in M&A have reported some level of 
uncertainty during the process and the highest level of uncertainty is experienced in the 
beginning of the process. Uncertainty and fear toward future can be decreased by formal 
communication. Formal communication generally resulted in positive reactions in ac-
quired company and stabilization of volatile situations.  
 
Communication has a major role in smoothing the cultural differences also. Shuhui and 
Seeger (2012) analyzed the poor acquisition between Taiwanese-based company BenQ 
and German company Siemens. The acquisition was not a great success and especially 
the communication related issues were poorly managed in this acquisition. Communica-
tion is considered even the most important issue during acquisition process and it has 
key role in integration of two different cultures. Simple issue like lack of proficiency of 
foreign language leads to great problems and it creates even a real costs. Communica-
tion process between companies from different cultures is very prone to rumor mills and 
misinterpretations. Management’s role in communication is vital and the lack of this 
role of management was one big problem in the acquisition of BenQ and Siemens. Ex-
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ecutives did not keep the employees updated and the role of certain employee in the 
process was unclear.  
 
Hubbard and Purcell (2001) have pointed out that managing employee expectations in 
mergers and acquisitions have significant impact on later integration and success of the 
whole project. Employees who were aware of their job and who had a clear picture of 
their own role in the new organization had positive attitude toward the process. Espe-
cially trust between management and employees was a significant factor which made 
the process easier. Aligned findings can be found also from study by Teerikangas 
(2012). According to her findings employees’ attitude toward process was positive and 
opportunistic rather than uncertain.  However the management has big role here because 
if they managed to create an atmosphere of success the employees were also highly mo-
tivated and opportunistic toward future. In conclusion the right way to take care of 
communication has a major role in the success of M&As. If the goals, vision of the fu-
ture and employees’ role in the new organization are clearly noted, the probability to 
achieve positive result is good.  
 
4.1.7. Future Compensation Policy 
 
Management compensation in the new entity is also vital factor on the way toward suc-
cessful business combination. Management’s compensation should be aligned with the 
company’s objectives. Contradiction in compensation policy and company’s objectives 
can dramatically danger the success of combination. (Gomes 2013.) Inkpen, Sundaram 
and Rockwood (2000) have supporting conclusions about compensation policy and 
company’s objectives. They state that compensation policy can create a contradiction 
between individuals’ and company’s goals. For example stock options are much used 
methods to align both parties’ goals.  
 
Devers, Cannella Jr., Reilly and Yoder (2007) studied the different payment structures 
and their impact on company’s performance and shareholders’ wealth. Residual in-
come-based compensation plans, where management is paid by return excess of re-
quired rate of return, had positively affected on increase of residual income. However 
these plans had no positive impact on shareholder wealth. Second variation is paying for 
performance and in this system management’s remuneration is connected with different 
kind of performance measures. This kind of system seemed to have positive effect on 
shareholders’ wealth and on accounting earnings. Firms which took this kind of pay-
ment plan had better stock-price performance even year after the implementation of the 
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plan. Third variation that they investigated was a system where managements’ owner-
ship in the company was in the center. Result was that management’s ownership gradu-
ally increased after the implementation of the plan. In addition they also found excess 
stock and accounting returns. The last system they investigated was the effects of eco-
nomic profit plans (EPPs). This system rewards managers when earnings exceed the 
cost of capital of strategy and performance. This method was not associated with ab-
normal shareholder values but adapters of this method managed assets more efficiently 
and had higher profitability.  
 
In conclusion the payment policy clearly effects on firm’s performance and sharehold-
ers´ wealth. As stated earlier, compensation policy where management’s incentives are 
aligned with company’s goals is effective. Performance measures which are wide 
enough to measure the overall performance of the company are effective. In addition 
equity based and ownership based payment methods are effective because then man-
agement’s income is dependent on firm’s performance. For example, it is proved that 
the CEOs’ ownership has positive impact on the transaction profitability. (Anslinger & 
Copeland 1996). 
 
4.1.8. Interrelations between Pre-acquisition Success Factors 
 
Above represented factors are crucial for success of mergers and acquisitions. Taking 
care of these issues gives a good background for successful transaction. Despite these 
factors were represented separately they still have to work properly together. According 
to previous research, combination of these success factors is in the center of successful 
operations. Previous findings for example support the combined effect of choice of stra-
tegic partner. Organizational and strategic fit can be improved by considering the size 
effects of partner. In addition the complementary competencies and resources can be 
effectively combined with absolute size effects. Also the size and method of payment is 
recognized to have some significant effect on result. Mergers where transaction is paid 
by cash and the target company is large are noticed to performance well. In contrast 
transactions where payment of method was cash but target company was small founded 
to be less competent. (Gomes et.al. 2013.)     
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4.2. Post-merger Critical Success Factors 
 
4.2.1. Integration Strategies  
 
Pre-merger factors are vital issues in terms of successful merger. However without suf-
ficient integration of all the combined elements the result will be disaster. Some previ-
ous discussions state even that post-merger phase and integration is the most crucial 
factor in final wealth creation process. Poor integration is noted one of the biggest rea-
son for merger and acquisition failures. Integration is not simply task because M&As 
taken from different context and from different reasons demand unique and proper inte-
gration operations. Integration process must reflect these differences. (Gomes et.al. 
2013.) 
 
Because of multifunctional characteristic of M&A process the integration process is not 
a simple task. It is very challenging to reach all the synergy potential because of differ-
ent organizational and national cultures and because of various working habits that 
companies have maintained before the merger. Integration process and success of mer-
gers and acquisitions is in the scope of the study by Almor, Tama and Benjamin (2009) 
which investigated the merger between two pharmaceutical companies and their integra-
tion process. Their findings related to integration are part of the wider framework for 
integration but the main finding from their study is that level of autonomy is in crucial 
role in success. Level of autonomy for acquired company is linked with the speed of 
market performance. If the motive of the merger is quick entering in markets with a new 
products the lower level of autonomy and higher level of integration is needed. The em-
pirical results prove that effects are good at least in the short-run but the long-run effects 
are ambiguous. In contrast if the motive is the long-term entering into market with well-
prepared products the integration level should be lower and level on autonomy in con-
trast should be higher. This allows creating of long-term synergies and the wealth ef-
fects are more likely to stand in longer term. Aligned findings are also in the study by 
Zaheer, Castaner and Souder (2013). Their conclusion is also that level of autonomy 
and level of integration depend on certain goals of the entity. However there are also 
situations where both high level of integration and high level of autonomy may exist. 
This kind of situation may exist in merger where the primary source of synergy was a 
complementarity rather than similarity.  
 
Studies by Schweiger and Goulet (2005) and Hopkins (2008) have paid attention on 
cultural issues and integration and according to these studies mergers and acquisitions 
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which fail in integration of cultural issues will perform poorly in the future. It is admit-
ted that cultural fit has a major role in merger success and for example companies which 
allow multiculturalism and prevent too much control perform better compared with 
firms which have stricter style. In addition these studies state that the cost of cultural 
conflicts resulting from poor integration may be even 25-30 percent of the acquirer’s 
performance. In order to avoid this cost the firms must pay attention in integration pro-
cedures which enhance cultural understanding and resolve cultural differences between 
firms.   
 
4.2.2. Post-acquisition Leadership 
 
Leadership is needed in post-acquisition operations because without competent leaders 
the process will not be finished successfully. New combined organization with a man-
agement without competency to make right comprehensive decisions seems to be one 
big reason of failure of M&As. New organization need a strong leadership which makes 
the right things to happen in order to wanted changes and aimed goals will be achieved. 
It is proved that high percentage of M&As failure because of poor management during 
the implementation. Because corporate restructurings include often elimination or shut-
ting down of some previously existed units the leader in the process must have right 
characteristics for the changing processes. However it is also proved that top manage-
ment change is very common feature in corporate restructuring operations. (Gomes 
et.al. 2013.) 
 
Leadership in mergers and acquisitions is multiform issue and the different types of 
managers should be used in different situations. The role of management is dependent 
on aim and the form of the transaction. Different types of management should be used 
in different kind of integration processes. Generally different individuals own different 
skills and hence it is important to know when should certain type of managers used. 
Managers in corporate control operations can be divided in insiders and outsiders. Both 
types have certain tasks and skills. Insider managers are proved to be effective in main-
taining the integrity and core competencies of acquired company. In contrast using in-
siders is not that effective when rapid internal changes are wanted. Insider managers are 
the best choice for example in preservation acquisitions which do not include many 
changes in acquired firm. Outsiders in contrast are effective in mergers and acquisitions 
where rapid change and quick action is wanted. Outsider managers do not hold the same 
kind of relationship to acquired company and hence the view of these managers is more 
objective. Using of outsiders is reasonable option in acquisitions which include for ex-
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ample high level of absorption. In conclusion using a different kind of managers is re-
lated to the goals and forms of integration. (Anqwin & Meadows 2009.) 
 
4.2.3. Speed of Integration 
 
Speed of integration process is quite novel topic in the literature which concerns the 
success of mergers and acquisitions. According to existing studies the speed is im-
portant factor in the successful integration. General view is that quick integration pro-
cess is beneficial because slow progress may cause some uncertainty and build rumors 
about process’ performance. In addition morale can suffer and some customers can get 
forgotten. It is stated that costs of losing momentum are much greater than the possible 
mistakes which may happen because of fast decisions. (Gomes et.al. 2013.) According 
to Vester (2002) the speed of integration is seemed to be one of the six most important 
factors affecting on M&A success. Keeping up high speed in merger and acquisition 
process is crucial because there is only limited amount of time but the amount of the 
vital decisions is also huge. If high speed is not kept the whole process may failure be-
cause of low integration speed. In contrast there are also some suggestions in previous 
literature that high speed may create even problems. Slow integration speed may help to 
reduce conflicts and it enables build trust among employees (Gomes et.al. 2013). 
 
Study by Bauer and Matzel (2014) has investigated the integration process and the im-
pact of speed on success of mergers and acquisitions. They couldn’t provide true empir-
ical evidence that integration speed has straight impact on M&A success but managers 
must be aware of this factor. Many consulting companies follow the 100-days rule in 
integration. 100-days integration is quite high speed and it is argued that benefits from 
fast integration are at least: faster exploitation of synergies and returns, reducing of un-
certainty among employees, minimizing the time spent in suboptimal conditions, and 
taking advantage of the momentum right after deal.  
 
Because the role of speed is not clear yet the used integration speed must be analyzed 
case by case. Speed of integration depends on background of the process and expected 
goals. Internal and external relatedness is proved to have impact on chosen integration 
speed. Internal relatedness is affiliated to things like similar management habits. Exter-
nal relatedness is in contrast related in things like market position and industry. It is 
proved that speed is the most beneficial when combining companies are related highly 
internally and less externally. In contrast speed can be destructive if external relatedness 
is high and internal relatedness is low. (Homburg & Bucenius 2006.) 
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4.2.4. Post-merger Integration Team and Disregard of Day-to-Day Business Activi-
ties 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are complex processes and they demand a lot from managers. 
This could be a problem if managers put all their effort on transition process and hence 
the day-to-day operations are left on less attention. This can be one source of failure and 
managers should pay attention that normal operations must also be performed well. 
Managers should find an optimal equilibrium between external and internal develop-
ment operations. (Gomes 2013). 
 
Because mergers and acquisitions are demanding processes, some organizations use 
certain kind of transition teams or Top Management Teams (TMTs) which are in re-
sponsibility to conduct the transition. Organizations are very dependent on TMTs opera-
tions and the whole performance during the transition relies on the hand of TMT. Well 
performing TMT can secure the success of the firm during and after the corporate con-
trol process. TMT has a big role in value creation and achieving the expected synergies 
after the process in finished. Because of dynamic role of acquisitions they have major 
impact on organization’s stakeholders like employees and on organizational perfor-
mance. Hence TMT should properly emphasize the goals of the project; the strategic 
and organizational fit and how to create employees trust toward the project.  If TMT 
manages to achieve their goals the expected result is more likely to be successful. In 
order to perform successfully and value creating, TMT should have some certain capa-
bilities. TMT should include two kinds of capabilities, individual capabilities and capa-
bilities which make them well functioning team. In addition all the members of the 
TMT must act in the interests of firm and team performance in order to ensure the suc-
cess of the acquisition and to ensure that the aimed benefits from synergy are reached. 
(Vasilaki & O’Regan 2008.) 
 
4.2.5. Communication during Implementation 
 
Communication after the acquisition is in critical role because its task is to disseminate 
the purpose of the acquisition and convey the integration message. Previous literature 
has stated that post-acquisition is essential practice within other human resource opera-
tions because it has important impact on diminishing the uncertainty and insecurity. 
Because communication can have many forms it is very important that managers stand 
behind their words. That’s why managers should only make promises that they really 
can keep. (Gomes et.al. 2013). 
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Because of complex role of the mergers and acquisitions they can create unwanted ef-
fects in organization. Mergers and acquisitions have proved to increase uncertainty 
within organization and increase of uncertainty is bad thing for the success of the pro-
ject. Increase of uncertainty seems to raise stress and decrease satisfaction, decrease 
commitment intentions to remain with an organization, and decrease perceptions of the 
organization’s trustworthiness, honesty and caring. These problems may lead in poor 
performance of combined organization. It is proved that if employees are well informed 
and their expectations during the merger process are maintained it is easier for them 
motivate toward process. Proper communication and information before and during the 
M&A process may have significant effect on prevention of dysfunctional outcomes. 
(Schweiger & Denisi 1991.) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are big challenge for human resource management of the 
companies. Mergers and acquisitions occur more and more beyond the national borders 
and that challenges organizations with cultural aspects. Studies by Weber and Tarba 
(2010) and by Schweiger, Napier and Csiszar (1993) have discussed of cultural fit prob-
lems and how should these issues managed in mergers and acquisitions. These studies 
have stated that cultural issues can create serious problems and the result can be even 
culture crash which remarkably decreases the success of the project. Proper communica-
tion is an effective tool for resolving the possible cultural problems. Communication 
helps employees’ adaptation in new organization and it can remove the possible biases. 
Because of very dynamic role of the M&As the created organization should be as co-
herent as possible. Coherent organization allows employees from both parties to share 
implicit and explicit knowledge and sharing these vital practices may be the key factor 
for well performing organization. 
  
Differences between cultures should be understood and acquiring company should be 
prepared for possible cultural challenges. Employees must have opportunity to learn 
about their new counterparts and there should be base for open dialog where both par-
ties can get know each other.  Open dialog removes the stereotypes and decreases the 
possibility of future conflicts.  
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4.2.6. Managing Corporate and National Cultural Differences 
 
Poor cultural fit is used as an explanation for poor post-acquisition performance of 
many mergers and acquisitions. Cultural differences can be seen in many levels: nation-
al, regional, industrial, company, and professional levels. Especially in cross-border 
transactions the cultural differences is proved to have significant effect. Problems with 
cultural fit have proved to be correlated with poor accounting measures and stock values 
in domestic M&As. In addition cultural distance problems have seen to raise problems 
and lead in poor performance in cross cultural transactions. Cultural issues are also con-
nected with different stages of integration because cultural concerns effect differently in 
different levels of integration. However cultural differences can sometimes be even the 
source of post-acquisition success. Moderate and controlled cultural differences can 
create competitive advantage they are managed and integrated in right way. (Gomes 
et.al. 2013). 
 
Weber and Tarba (2012) have studied the cultural factors and their impact on organiza-
tion’s success. They have stated that cultural issues must be managed properly and for 
that reason they have created a special framework. They have divided integration pro-
cess in various stages and in every stage they have mentioned how to handle cultural 
aspects. Integration process is divided in three stages and stage three concerns the post-
acquisition period. They have stated that during the post-acquisition period company 
must set the appropriate integration approach, choose the units which will be in the cen-
ter of integration, and define the desired organization culture. Stage three in post-
acquisition period includes defining critical issues like how big are the cultural differ-
ences, what kind of problems arise from cultural differences, and which functions are 
the most prone for cultural conflicts. Conclusion from their paper is that preparing and 
concentrating properly for cultural issues companies can ensure their long-term success 
and hence make sure that complex and multidimensional projects like mergers and ac-
quisitions are value increasing transactions. Cultural issues really exist and they must be 
managed or otherwise problems will arise sooner or later.  
 
4.2.7. Human Resource Management 
 
Problems arising from human resource issues can prevent the optimal exploitation of 
the expected synergies in mergers and acquisitions. By better human resource manage-
ment all the workforce’s capabilities and knowledge can be utilized and the result is 
profitable synergies, value creation and effective transfer of knowledge and good prac-
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tices. Certain HR practices aim to prevent future problems in corporate restructurings 
and specific practices are for example: training employees to deal with conflicts and 
new assignments during the integration, using communication to address human re-
source stress and uncertainty, and adjusting other practices to the new situation. (Gomes 
et.al. 2013). 
 
Previous literature concerning profitability of the mergers and acquisitions is at least 
ambiguous, because the expected and stated synergies and wealth effects are not always 
reached. Major reason for value decrease and failure is too high premiums paid for tar-
get company. High premiums load huge expectations on organizations performance and 
unfortunately very often the expected synergies and value effects are not reached. Hu-
man resource management has important role in mergers and acquisitions and possible 
problems can be prevented by proper HR actions. High premiums lead to failure at least 
by two reasons: by pressures to realize quick value through cost-cutting and through 
employee resistance that undercuts prospects for success. HR management skills are 
needed in the all stages of transaction. Firstly HR management must consult the other 
management about expected labor synergies, cost related in new workforce, and evalu-
ate possible reductions in workforce. HR professionals should also be able to evaluate 
the value of workforce and analyze the actions how maximum benefit is reached by new 
combined workforce. Secondly HR management must be used in implementation of 
new workforce. Human resource professional must find right persons in critical posi-
tions, enable the effective transfer of explicit and tacit knowledge and maintain the pro-
ductive and motivated atmosphere in the organization. By proper preparing and well 
planned implementation the problem of too high premium would never exist and the 
expected synergies for combination are more likely achieved. (Trank, Stambaugh & 
Bemis 2012.) 
 
In global business cross-border mergers and acquisitions are everyday phenomenon. 
Cross-border operations include always possible concerns related to cultural differences. 
International projects and cultural differences challenge also human resource manage-
ment. Champers (2013) has discussed about cross-border deals and HR’s role in these 
transactions. He has stated that human resource management has four roles in mergers 
and acquisitions: strategic partner, change agent, administrative expert, and employee 
champion. As a strategic partner HR leaders align HR operations with organization’s 
strategic business goals. Aligned operations are the major force behind value creation 
and success. Biggest challenges relate in alignment of different practices between dif-
ferent countries and cultures. The role as a change agent relates in making corporation 
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more competitive. In order to achieve expected results the organizations must be able to 
change and adapt in new situations. Biggest challenges relate in motivating employees 
and other managers toward change and facilitating favorable base for the change. As an 
administrative experts HR managers deliver efficient processes that exploit new tech-
nologies and improved methods. By these activities HR experts notice the opportunities 
to add value. Global challenges relate for example recruiting and selecting employees in 
a timely and cost-efficient manner and providing efficient training programs. The fourth 
role, employee champion, relates in two main issues. Firstly HR managers must listen 
and respond to employees’ needs with available resources. Secondly, HR managers aim 
to increase employees’ knowledge, skill, and ability to contribute to company goals. 
Global challenges relate for example issues like establishing an international HR and 
meeting global employee information needs.  
 
4.2.8. Interrelationships between Post-acquisition Critical Success Factors 
 
Every presented factor has important role in successful transaction and in order to 
achieve good results every factor must be considered properly. However these single 
factors must work effectively also together and hence the interrelationships between 
critical factors are essential source of success. Previous studies have found possible in-
terrelation aspects for example between integration strategies and speed of integration. 
Speed of integration and integration strategy are strictly linked each other but the valid 
speed and strategy should be selected case by case. Proper speed of integration is related 
for example in the degree of integration. Another interrelationship exists between cho-
sen integration strategy and usage of top management team. Certain management teams 
have different capabilities and hence the link between strategy and usage of manage-
ment teams must be considered properly. Third important interrelationship exists be-
tween integration strategy and cultural differences. Because cultural issues are consid-
ered to be source of possible conflicts or in some cases source of superior performance, 
the chosen strategy must be aligned with these constraints. (Gomes et.al. 2013). 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1. Data 
 
The empirical part of the study began with the data collection. First restriction related to 
data is that only publicly traded acquirers are investigated and the reason for that is the 
data availability. In some cases it is almost impossible to find out the financial data of 
the private companies so this study concentrates only in publicly traded companies. 
Secondly the study concentrates only in the acquirer’s profitability and that is also relat-
ed with data availability. It is very challenging to obtain financial data of private ac-
quired companies.  
 
Record of mergers and acquisitions is from the database of the department of the Ac-
counting and Finance in the University of Vaasa and the primary source of this database 
is Datastream. Additional sources for the data are companies’ annual statements and 
companies’ stock exchange releases. Because the purpose of the study is also to find out 
whether there is difference between, before and during the crisis, periods, the total time 
period includes period from 2001-2010.  Period 2001-2003 is defined as a pre-crisis 
period and period 2008-2010 is defined as a crisis period. Year 2007 is considered as a 
break year for the pre-crisis and crisis periods and hence the observations from 2007 are 
not taken into account.  
 
After all the mergers and acquisitions by publicly traded Finnish companies were ob-
tained, the next step was to match the announcement day, target company and the price 
of the transaction. Prices of the transactions were obtained from companies’ financial 
statements and from the market announcements of the companies. Because the short-
term profitability was obtained by using the event study methodology according to 
MacKinlay (1997) it was crucial to obtain the prices of the transactions. In addition the 
price of the transaction must equal the certain size because the “event” must be signifi-
cant enough in order some effects can be expected. The price of the transaction must be 
at least 5% of the acquirer’s book value in order the transaction is included in the sam-
ple. According to Rosen (2006) this five (5%) percent cut-off rate is big enough. Totally 
the used sample includes 80 transactions in which 43 transactions belong to pre-crisis 
period and rest 37 belongs to crisis period. Total number of companies included in the 
data is 64.  
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Short-term event study methodology according to MacKinlay (1997) demands the mar-
ket returns and beta-coefficients. Market index returns for examined period are also 
available in the database of the department of the Accounting and Finance of the Uni-
versity of Vaasa, where the primary source is the Datastream and beta coefficients for 
the market model are estimated from the certain stock and market index returns. The 
long-term profitability is obtained by wealth relative method and the used wealth rela-
tive method is slightly different from market model. The method for long-term profita-
bility is the same that Jakobsen & Voetman (2003) has used in their study and this 
method requires the matching firm and also market index data and these data are also 
available from the database of the department of the Accounting and Finance of the 
University of Vaasa, which is collected from Datastream. Wealth relative method has 
slightly same requirements as event study method do so in conclusion the data set for 
long-term investigation is same than used in short-term investigation.   
 
In conclusion the data must meet the following requirements: the announcement date of 
the transaction must be known, the book-value of the acquirer must be known, the price 
of the transaction must be available, returns of market index must be known and the 
returns for matching firms must be known. In addition transaction and companies are 
included in the sample if the price of the transaction is at least 5% from the book-value 
of the acquirer (Rosen 2006) and the stock price data is available one (1) year before 
and at least three (3) years after the announcement. Finally the total period 2001-2010 
(excluding year 2007) is divided into two sub periods: 2001-2003 is defined as the pre-
crisis period and 2008-2010 is defined as the crisis period. 
 
 
5.2. Methodology 
 
5.2.1. Methodology for short-term returns 
 
As mentioned before, this study uses the event study methodology in order to capture 
the short-term impact of mergers and acquisitions on companies’ profitability. Event 
study method according to MacKinlay (1997) is very useful for studies which investi-
gate the certain events impact on companies’ returns. In this study the events are the 
mergers and acquisitions. Equation for event-study method exploits the market model 
and the equation for market model is following: 
 
(1)  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected normal return of company i, 𝛼𝑖 is the stock specific pa-
rameter of the market model equation, 𝛽𝑖 is the stock specific beta coefficient of the 
market model, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market index return, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the standard error term of the 
model. Market model is used to estimate the expected normal returns of certain stock. 
When normal expected returns are estimated, the next step is to calculate the abnormal 
return. The main idea behind event-study is that the certain event (here mergers and 
acquisitions) has impact on company’s profitability and if the event really has impact it 
will generate abnormal returns. In order to calculate the abnormal returns the following 
equation is used: 
 
(2)  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)  
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return from the event, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the realized return of the stock, 
and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected normal return from equation (1).  
 
In order to capture the short-term effects of the mergers and acquisitions the above rep-
resented equations are used and they are used in different periods. Jakobsen & Voetman 
(2003) have investigated also the mergers and acquisitions in the short-term with event 
study method. The maximum event window in their study is -15;+15. According to their 
study the same maximum event window will be used also in this study. In addition this 
study uses the -1;+1 event window in order to capture the abnormal returns exactly 
around the event.  
 
After the abnormal returns for every merged and acquired company has been calculated, 
they will be collected in the portfolio. Abnormal return of the portfolio for certain peri-
od is the average of all the stocks abnormal returns included in the portfolio. Average 
Abnormal Return for certain period is calculated by following equation 
 
(3)  𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑝 =  
1
𝑁
∗  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1  
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑝 is the average abnormal return of the merged and acquired companies, N 
is the number of companies which made the merger or acquisition, and 𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the ab-
normal return of certain stock including in portfolio. After the average abnormal return 
for certain period is calculated it is possible to calculate the cumulated abnormal return 
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for the whole estimation period t1 – t2. This cumulated abnormal return is calculated by 
the following equation 
 
(4)  𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 =  ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑝
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1  
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 is the cumulative average abnormal return for period t1 – t2 and 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑝 is the average abnormal return of the portfolio for period t. This cumulative av-
erage abnormal return allows capturing the general impact of mergers and acquisitions 
in the short-term.  
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns will be calculated for both sub-periods. Because 
the aim of the study was to capture the impact of mergers and acquisitions and compare 
the profitability between different periods, the t-tests for statistical significance will be 
conducted. First, the certain period’s significance will be tested against zero and after 
that those parameter will be tested against each other in order to find whether there is a 
significant difference between these two variables.  
 
Simple t-test for testing the significance of abnormal return in certain periods (pre-crisis 
and during the crisis) is performed with the following equation: 
 
(5)  𝑡 =  
𝑥−𝜇0
𝑠/√𝑛
 
 
where t is the t-value from the test and its statistical significance is compared against 
5% critical value,  𝑥 is the sample mean which refers here to the calculated mean of 
cumulated abnormal returns, 𝜇 is the value which against the  𝑥 is tested. In this study 
the 𝜇 is zero. 𝑠 is the standard deviation of the sample and n is the number of the trans-
actions in the sample.  
 
After the statistical significance of the abnormal returns is calculated for both periods, 
the difference between these two periods is tested with paired t-test. Paired t-test is con-
ducted by following equation: 
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(6)  𝑡 =  (𝑥
1
− 𝑥2)/√(𝑠12/𝑛1 + 𝑠22/𝑛2) 
where t is again the t-value from the test and its significance is compared against 5% 
critical value, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are the average abnormal returns from pre-crisis and crisis pe-
riods, 𝑠1and 𝑠2 are the standard deviations for the returns of both periods, and 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 
are the total number of the transactions during these periods.  
5.2.2. Methodology for long-term returns 
 
Long-term returns for M&A companies could be calculated and tested by same event 
study methodology as it is done for short-term returns. Many previous studies have used 
exactly the same method where the first thing is to estimate the expected returns and 
then the abnormal returns would be the difference between realized and expected re-
turns. However the methodology for long-term returns will be different in this study. 
The used method is called the wealth relative method which was first time introduced 
by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). This method will be discussed de-
tailed later but first it is important to argument why this method is used. 
 
First argument against long-term event studies is represented by Fama (1998). He states 
that event-study methodology is very useful in order to capture the impact of certain 
events on stocks’ prices in the short-term. In the short-term the normal expected returns 
are close to zero, hence the abnormal returns in the short-term can be linked to the cer-
tain event. Fama has introduced so called bad model problem. According to his findings 
many anomalies exist due to used methodology. This assumption implies that actually 
almost every anomaly can exist or disappear if proper methodology is used. The bad 
model problem arises from biased expectations and it has impact on both short- and 
long-term returns. However the bias from bad model problem is bigger for long-term 
methods because the errors in expectations become bigger in the long-term.  
 
Fama’s argument about bad model problem gets support from Barber and Lyon (1997). 
They have studied the long-term abnormal return method which is used in event studies 
and their results highlight the following three problems of the long-term event studies: 
new listing bias, rebalancing bias, and skewness bias. As represented earlier, the ab-
normal returns can be obtained from estimated returns or then from reference returns. 
According to Fama (1998), the estimation error increases when the period is longer. 
New listing bias, rebalancing bias, and skewness bias relate to reference method, where 
the abnormal return is obtained as a difference between examined stock return and the 
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reference stock return. New listing bias occurs because the reference portfolio may 
change very often compared to analyzed portfolio, rebalancing bias is associated with 
new listing bias because the reference portfolio is rebalanced periodically and the re-
turns are calculated assuming this periodic rebalancing; however the returns of target 
portfolio are calculated without rebalancing, skewness bias is the result of positively 
skewed long-run abnormal returns. According to Barber and Lyon (1997), using refer-
ence portfolios result in higher rejection rates because of those biases. In order to get 
more realistic results it is appropriate to take into account these problems when con-
structing the methodology for long-run returns.  
 
Considering the bad model problem by Fama (1998) and the new listing bias, rebalanc-
ing bias, and skewness bias by Barber and Lyon (1997), this study will use the wealth 
relative method for long-run returns. Wealth relative method is first time represented by 
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). They have used this wealth relative 
method for event study like situations in order to capture the long-term effects. After 
them for example Jakobsen and Voetman (2003) have used this same methodology in 
order to study the mergers and acquisitions in Denmark. The paper by Jakobsen and 
Voetman (2003) was one of the main incentives of this study and the methodology part 
of this study will follow their paper quite closely. Base for wealth relative method is in 
buy-and-hold return calculations. From the statistical point of view the long-term buy-
and-hold returns has severe skewness problem. However the wealth relative transfor-
mation of buy-and-hold returns can be accepted to be log-normally distributed, hence 
the logarithms of the wealth relatives can be accepted to be normally distributed and 
hence the using of general statistical tests is possible (Jakobsen & Voetman 2003).  
 
In order to calculate the wealth relatives, the long-term buy-and-hold-returns must be 
first calculated. In addition buy-and-hold-returns for matching firms and for the stock 
index must be calculated. Matching firms are selected according to market value and 
Book-to-Market (B/M) measures. It is assumed that firms with equal market value and 
B/M can be expected to have similar characteristics and hence the comparing is reason-
able. In this study the buy-and-hold returns are calculated on monthly basis and the 
long-term impact is the result of compounded monthly returns. Maximum examined 
holding period in this study is 36 months (3 years) but also results for 6, 12, 18, 24 and 
30 months are represented. Buy-and-hold returns are used also because they are sug-
gested to represent best the real situation that investors experience.  
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Buy-and-hold-returns can be imagined to be the wealth increase (decrease) the investor 
get if initial amount of 𝑊𝑖,0 is invested in stock i and the monthly returns are 𝑟𝑖,𝑡. The 
initial amount after t months is then: 
 
(7)  𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖,0 ∗ ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑡
𝑡=1  
 
From the equation (5) the buy-and-hold return for the stock i for t months is then: 
 
(8)  𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 1
𝑡
𝑡=1  
 
After calculating the buy-and-hold returns for M&A stocks, matching firms, and stock 
index, it is possible to calculate the wealth relatives. Basically wealth relative is the ac-
cumulated wealth of M&A stock compared with matching firm or the market index. 
The equation for wealth relative is following: 
 
(9)  𝑊 𝑖
𝑚
,𝑡
=  𝑊 𝑖
𝑚
,0
∗ ∏
(1+𝑟𝑖,𝑡)
(1+𝑟𝑚,𝑡)
𝑡
𝑡=1  
 
 
where 𝑊 𝑖
𝑚
,0
 is the initial wealth relative for M&A stock and matching firm or market 
index. The initial wealth relative can be accepted to be one (1.0) and 𝑊 𝑖
𝑚
,𝑡
 is the wealth 
relative after t months. After wealth relatives are calculated for each stock, the portfolio 
wealth relative of the M&A companies is calculated as an average of the companies’ 
values.   
 
Wealth relative value which is bigger than one (wealth relative > 1.0) shows that M&A 
companies have performed better than matching firms or market index. In contrast if 
wealth relative value is smaller than one (wealth relative < 1.0) the M&A companies 
have underperformed related to matching firms or market index. Wealth relative can be 
calculated for both M&A companies compared with matching firms and market index 
or matching firms compared with M&A companies. First way shows the M&A compa-
nies under- or outperformance and the second, inverse equation, shows same for match-
ing firms and market index. Wealth relative is just measure for how M&A companies 
have done related to matching firms or market index. In order to get real results about 
performance, the wealth relative measure must be decomposed into mean and volatility 
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factors. Wealth relatives alone cannot show the real truth because the volatility compo-
nent makes the results upward biased. Decomposing of wealth relatives is made by fol-
lowing way: 
 
(10) 𝐸(𝑊𝑅𝑡) = exp(𝜇𝑡𝑇) = exp (𝛼𝑡𝑇 +
1
2
 𝜎𝑡
2𝑇) = exp(𝛼𝑡𝑇) ∗ exp (
1
2
 𝜎𝑡
2𝑇) 
 
 
where exp(𝛼𝑡𝑇) is the transformed mean component and exp (
1
2
 𝜎𝑡
2𝑇) is the volatility 
component. As it can be seen, the volatility component causes upward bias and hence 
the results must be volatility adjusted by comparing just the decomposed mean compo-
nents. Mean- and variance estimations for wealth relatives can be calculated by follow-
ing equations: 
 
(11)   ?̂? =  
1
𝑡∗𝑁
∑ log (𝑊𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 )𝑁𝑖=1  
 
(12)  ?̂?𝑡
2 =
1
𝑇∗(𝑁−1)
∑ (log(𝑊𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑀 ) − ?̂?𝑡 ∗ 𝑇)^2
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 
These mean and variance components are marginal estimates for the expected wealth 
relative at time t. With these estimates it is possible to perform statistical test and figure 
out how M&A companies perform compared with matching firms or market index. The 
wealth relatives can be accepted to be log-normally distributed and the marginal esti-
mates for log( 𝑊
𝑖
𝑚
, 𝑇) are ?̂? 𝑖
𝑚
,𝑇
∗ 𝑇 and ?̂? 𝑖
𝑚
,𝑇
∗ √𝑇.  
 
Log( 𝑊
𝑖
𝑚
, 𝑇) is normally distributed and hence also are the marginal estimates. With 
normally distributed marginal estimates it is possible to make statistical significance 
tests. Testing the mean component is the most important test which tells whether there 
is statistically significant difference in M&A companies’ performance or not. Testing 
the means between two sub-periods also tells whether there is difference in the perfor-
mance between different periods.   
 
In the next section the buy-and-returns for all the M&A companies, matching firms, and 
market index will be calculated. After that the wealth ratios are calculated for both 
M&A companies compared with matching firms and market index. After wealth rela-
tives are calculated the values are decomposed into the mean and volatility components. 
For both sub-periods the mean components are tested against zero with general t-test 
and in addition the difference between two sub periods’ mean components is calculated 
in order to find out whether there is statistically significant difference between two peri-
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ods’ performance. Significance test for the means and for the difference of the means 
are conducted by using the equations 5 and 6.   
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
6.1. Short-term profitability 
 
Short-term profitability of Finnish companies M&A transactions are calculated by using 
the methodologies introduced in the previous chapter. As mentioned earlier the total 
number of the transactions made is 80 and the total number of companies which are 
analyzed is 64. In addition the short-term profitability is calculated for two sub periods 
(pre-crisis period and crisis period), for the total period and in addition the comparison 
between these two sub-periods is conducted.  
 
In order to find out and test the short-term returns, the abnormal returns from market 
model are calculated. Abnormal returns for the merger and acquirer companies are cal-
culated with two different event windows. Two event windows used in this study are -
1:+1 and -15:+15 days. The purpose for using two event windows is that results should 
give as comprehensive results as possible about short-term profitability.  
 
Short-term abnormal returns for two event windows and for two periods are represented 
in the following tables. Column 3 of the table 1 includes the mean abnormal return of 
the pre-crisis period, column 4 in table 1 includes the standard deviation of the abnor-
mal returns, column 5 in table 1 includes the standard error of the abnormal returns, and 
column 6 in table 1 includes the t-test value for mean.  
 
 
Table 1. Short-term abnormal returns, pre-crisis period 
Event 
window 
N Mean 
abnormal 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error 
t-value 
-1:+1 43 1.61 % 5.5% 0.84% 1.92* 
-15:+15 43 -1.31 %, 24.58% 3.75% -0.35 
significance at 5% level **, significance at 10% level * 
 
 
Results from the short-term returns in the pre-crisis period show that during the an-
nouncement event -1:+1 the average abnormal return of M&A companies has been 
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positive (1.61%). After extending the event window the positive abnormal returns seem 
to vanish. The abnormal returns of the M&A companies during the event window -
15:+15 are negative (-1.31%).  
 
Abnormal returns seem to be quite volatile during the short-term period and very short 
period positive returns finally become negative when the event window is extended. 
These return calculations show just the absolute return development during the short-
term and in order to get arguments about the significance, the statistical significance of 
the results must be analyzed. The column 5 in the table 1 show the t-test values for the 
mean and these values reveal that neither of the abnormal returns are significantly dif-
ferent from zero at 5% significance level (returns of -1:+1 event window are significant 
just at 10% level). Hence the first hypothesis is supported for the short-term profitability 
in the first sub period (pre-crisis). 
 
The next table 2 shows the same statistics for the second sub-period (crisis). Again col-
umn 3 shows the mean abnormal return during the event window, column 4 shows the 
standard deviation of the returns, column 5 shows the standard error of the returns, and 
finally column 6 shows the t-test value for mean.  
 
 
Table 2. Short-term abnormal returns, crisis period 
Event 
window 
N Mean 
abnormal 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error 
t-value 
-1:+1 37 +3.53 14.80% 2.43% 1.45 
-15:+15 37 +2.97 % 28.10% 4.62% 0.64 
significant at 5% level **, significant at 10% level * 
  
 
Results from the short-term returns in the crisis period show that average abnormal re-
turns for both event windows are positive. However the positive returns are not statisti-
cally significant in crisis period.  
 
After analyzing the short-term returns during the two sub-periods it is interesting to find 
out what were the abnormal returns for the total period. This analyze is conducted by 
taking the average of two sub-periods abnormal returns. Analyze is done for both event-
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windows: -1:+1 and -15:+15. Table 3 shows the results for the whole period. Columns 
in the table include the same information as the columns in the previous tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
Table 3. Short-term abnormal returns, total period 
Event 
window 
N Mean 
abnormal 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error 
t-value 
-1:+1 80 2.50% 10.81% 1.21% 2.07** 
-15:+15 80 0.67% 26.19% 12.93% 0.229 
significant at 5% level **, significant at 10% level * 
  
 
Results show that while the total period is under analyze the Finnish companies M&A 
transactions produced positive abnormal returns for the both two event windows. Ab-
normal returns for both event windows were positive and actually the abnormal returns 
for the shorter, -1:+1, event window were even statistically significant at 5% level. This 
finding does not support the first hypothesis because transactions produced statistically 
significant abnormal returns.  
 
Despite the absolute values show that there is a difference in profitability between two 
periods, the significance of the difference must be conducted. In order to get a clear 
picture whether the short-term returns are bigger during the crisis period than pre-crisis 
period, the paired t-test for mean returns is conducted.  
 
The next table represents the results from paired t-test which is conducted for two inde-
pendent samples. Column 1 shows the used method, column 2 shows the number of 
observations, column 3 shows the event-window compared, column 4 shows the de-
grees of freedom, column 5 shows the value of the t-test, and the column 6 shows the p-
value of the test. 
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Table 4. Difference in profitability between two periods (pre-crisis, crisis) 
Method N Event window Df t-value p-value 
t-test 80 -1:+1 78 0.78 0.433 
t-test 80 -15:+15 78 -0.72 0.469 
significant at 5% level **, significant at 10% level * 
 
 
Results in the table 4 reveal that despite the absolute values were different between two 
periods the difference between these two analyzed periods was not statistically signifi-
cant. Values of the t-test are not very high and the p-values reveal that there is no signif-
icant difference between two periods.  
 
The first hypothesis of the thesis is: Mergers and acquisitions did not create any signifi-
cant abnormal returns for shareholders, not in short- and neither in the long-run. 
Hence in the light of these results it can be stated that the first hypothesis is not support-
ed, because companies which conducted M&A transactions created positive abnormal 
returns when the whole examined period is under analyze. Abnormal returns under the 
whole examined period were positive and statistically significant when the shorter 
event-window was analyzed (at 5% level) despite neither of the two-sub periods created 
significant positive abnormal returns (at 5% level).  
 
Short-term results are aligned with the previous study by Knif and Pape (2014), because 
Finnish companies’ M&A transactions seem to be wealth increasing transactions for the 
shareholders of the acquiring company. These findings are very interesting, because 
also the Knif and Pape’s study is performed with Finnish data. Many other previous 
studies with US and UK data have shown totally opposite results, because the general 
view is that M&A transactions are wealth decreasing transactions for the shareholders 
of the acquiring company. Short-term abnormal returns were statistically significant 
only during the shorter event window (-1:+1) and when the event window was extended 
(-15:+15) the positive effect seems to vanish. Fama (1991) has stated that efficient capi-
tal markets should reflect all the available information to the prices and according to this 
statement it seems that the prices in Finnish stock exchange seem to reflect the new in-
formation fast, because the impact of M&A announcements vanish when the analyzed 
period is extended. In addition it seems that investors expect that M&A transactions 
have efficient increasing impact on the new entity because the announcement of the 
transaction creates positive abnormal returns.  
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The second hypothesis of the thesis is: There is no difference in profitability of mergers 
and acquisitions made before and during the crisis. In contrast with the first hypothesis 
it can be stated that the second hypothesis is supported, because there was no statistical-
ly significant difference in profitability between pre-crisis and crisis period. Returns for 
the second period (crisis period) were positive for the both event windows but these 
returns were not significantly different compared with the first, pre-crisis, period. 
 
The second hypothesis challenges the value decreasing theory called managerial discre-
tion by Jensen (1986). Managerial discretion theory suggests that management of the 
company makes poorer investment decisions during extra cash flow. This theory would 
imply that actually the M&A transactions’ profitability was better during the more chal-
lenging, crisis, period, because companies must think every investment properly. How-
ever the empirical results are partly aligned with Jensen’s (1986) theory, because there 
was a difference in profitability between the two sub-periods, but the difference was not 
statistically significant.  
 
 
6.2. Long-term profitability 
 
Previous sub-chapter revealed what kind of returns Finnish companies M&A transac-
tions’ produced in the short-term period. As stated, this study aims is to give as compre-
hensive picture as possible about the M&A transactions’ profitability and hence this 
sub-chapter reveals how Finnish companies M&A transactions performed in the long-
term period. Analyze is done for both sub-periods (pre- crisis and crisis), for the whole 
period and the difference between two periods is also analyzed.  
 
6.2.1. Buy-and-hold returns of the M&A companies 
 
Long-term profitability analyze begins by calculating the buy-and-hold returns for the 
companies which have performed M&A transactions. Buy-and-hold returns for the 
companies are calculated with the equation (8). In order to get as comprehensive picture 
as possible the buy-and-hold returns are calculated for the M&A companies, matching 
firms, market index, for the both sub-periods, and for the whole analyzed period.  
 
Table 5 and figure 1 illustrate the buy-and-hold returns of the M&A companies, match-
ing firms, and market index during the first, pre-crisis, sub-period. Column 1 in table 5 
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show the period for which the buy-and-hold return is calculated and columns 2, 3 and 4 
show the buy-and-hold returns of M&A companies, matching companies (companies 
with same characteristics but without M&A transaction) and market index.  
 
 
Table 5. Pre-crisis period Buy-and-hold returns 
 
 
 
Table 6 and figure 2 show buy-and-hold returns of the M&A companies, matching 
companies and market index but now the analyzed period is the second, crisis, period.   
Month M&A companies Matching 
companies 
Market index 
6 -15% -3% -11% 
12 -15% -6% -15% 
18 -18% -8% -17% 
24 -13% -2% -15% 
30 3% 4% -9% 
36 3% 12% -3% 
Figure 1. Pre-crisis Buy-and-hold returns 
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Table 6. Crisis-period Buy-and-hold returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally table 7 and figure 3 shows how M&A companies, matching companies and 
market index performed when the total analyzed period is under examination.  
 
 
Month M&A companies 
Matching 
companies 
Market index 
6 -11% -9% -13% 
12 -14% -10% -18% 
18 -3% 5% -11% 
24 -1% 2% -10% 
30 3% 3% -12% 
36 -7% 0% -16% 
Figure 2. Crisis-period Buy-and-hold returns 
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Table 7. Total period Buy-and-hold returns 
 
  
Month M&A companies Matching companies Market index 
6 -13% -6% -12% 
12 -15% -8% -16% 
18 -11% -2% -14% 
24 -8% 0% -13% 
30 3% 4% -10% 
36 -2% 12% -9% 
Figure 3. Total period Buy-and-hold returns 
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Tables 5, 6 and 7 and figures 1, 2 and 3 reveal very clearly that during the both sub-
periods and during the whole examined period the matching companies have performed 
better than M&A companies. Matching companies have created higher buy-and-hold 
returns in the every analyzed period and in every different holding period. However 
M&A companies have outperformed the market index almost all the time. For example 
the table 7 and figure 3 reveal that market index has created higher buy-and-hold returns 
just under 11 month period after the transaction. Both returns still have been negative. 
Table 7 and figure 3 illustrate well that two years (24 months) after transaction the 
M&A companies have created negative buy-and-hold returns. However this trend 
changes after 30 months and finally the three years’ (36 months) buy-and-hold return of 
the M&A companies have been just slightly negative (-2%). These results from buy-
and-hold returns are in line with the previous studies’ findings that companies which 
conduct M&A transactions will destroy the shareholders’ value.  
 
6.2.2. Wealth relatives of the M&A companies 
 
In order to get more comprehensive picture about the M&A companies’ performance, 
the next thing is to analyze the wealth relatives of the M&A companies. Strength of 
wealth relative analysis is that according to Voetman & Jakobsen (2003) the wealth 
relative transformation of buy-and-hold returns can be accepted to be log-normally dis-
tributed. This means that the logarithms of the wealth relatives can be accepted to be 
normally distributed and hence the using of general statistical tests is possible. Next two 
tables 8 and 9 and the next two figures 4 and 5 show the wealth relatives of the M&A 
companies compared with matching companies and the wealth relatives of the M&A 
companies compared with market index.  
 
Table 8 and figure 4 show how wealth relatives of the M&A companies compared with 
matching companies have developed through the different holding periods. In addition 
they illustrate what kind of wealth relatives are obtained during two sub-periods and 
finally during the total analyzed period. Wealth relatives reveal that M&A companies 
have underperformed the matching firms during the all holding-periods and during the 
all analyzed periods (wealth-relative less than 1.0 means underperformance compared 
with matching company).  
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Table 8. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/matching companies 
 
  
Month 1
st
 sub-period 2
nd
 sub-period Total period 
6 0.874 0.971 0.917 
12 0.905 0.955 0.927 
18 0.893 0.919 0.905 
24 0.887 0.966 0.923 
30 0.995 0.990 0.993 
36 0.922 0.905 0.916 
Figure 4. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/matching companies 
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Table 9 and figure 5 shows how the wealth relatives of the M&A companies relative 
with market index have developed through the different holding periods. In addition 
they illustrate what kind of wealth relatives are obtained during two sub-periods and 
during the whole analyzed period. Values of table 9 and figure 5 reveal that M&A com-
panies have outperformed the market index almost all the time (wealth relative over  
1 means outperformance compared with market index). Wealth relative calculated from 
the whole period has been under 1 only during first 6 months.  
 
 
Table 9. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/market index 
  
Month 1
st
 sub-period 2
nd
 sub-period Total period 
6 0.947 1.046 0.989 
12 0.982 1.065 1.107 
18 0.991 1.096 1.035 
24 1.004 1.137 1.060 
30 1.092 1.208 1.142 
36 1.016 1.151 1.073 
Figure 5. Wealth relatives: M&A companies/market index 
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Wealth relatives show that M&A companies have underperformed the matching com-
panies all the time but in contrast they have outperformed the market index almost all 
the time. Wealth relatives M&A companies compared with matching companies give 
better approximation about the performance of the M&A companies, because matching 
companies have similar characteristics as M&A companies but they have not conducted 
the M&A transactions. As stated earlier the distribution of the wealth relatives can be 
approximated as a normally distributed. Hence it is possible to conduct general statisti-
cal tests for these values and make conclusion about the under- or outperformance. 
Equation (10) show that wealth relative values can be divided into two components: 
mean component and volatility component. In this equation the volatility component is 
always positive and it causes the bias into final values. In order to get clear picture how 
do M&A companies really perform in the long-term, the mean components of the 
wealth relatives must be analyzed.  
 
Mean component analyses are conducted by using the estimates from the equations (11) 
and (12). Mean components are calculated for both wealth relative measures (M&A 
companies compared with matching companies and M&A companies compared with 
market index) and also for both two sub-periods and for the whole analyzed period.  
 
Wealth relatives of M&A companies compared with matching companies are decom-
posed into mean component and volatility component and the important ones, mean 
components, are reported in the table 10 and graphed in the figure 6. In the table 10  the 
first column tells the holding period, second column tells the calculated mean compo-
nent, third column tells the standard deviation of the values, and fourth and fifth col-
umns tells the t-statistics and p-values from the mean test against zero. Columns two to 
five are divided into three groups and these individual groups tell what kind of mean 
components are obtained in different analyzing periods (pre-crisis, crisis and total). All 
the mean components are negative for every holding period and for every analyzing 
period. However, the statistical tests reveal that only one of these mean components 
(pre-crisis 6 month holding period) is significantly different from zero (mean compo-
nent -5.9%). Hence it can be concluded that despite the M&A companies created nega-
tive profitability compared with similar matching firms, the negative difference could 
not be stated statistically significant. 
 
It is important to note here the difference between wealth relative values and the mean 
component values. Wealth relative values interpret that M&A companies underperform 
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matching companies around 8% during the 36 months period.  However the real under-
performance can be seen from mean components because the volatility part causes bias 
into the calculated wealth relative values. Underperformance calculated by mean com-
ponent is 2% for the 36 months period. There is quite big difference in these two values 
and the mean component result depicts better the reality because the volatility compo-
nent bias is removed from these results.   
 
 
Table 10. Mean components: M&A companies/matching companies 
Month Mean 
component 
Standard 
deviation 
t-value p-value 
 
 
6 
pre-crisis -5.9%** pre-crisis 18.4% pre-crisis  
-   2.086** 
pre-crisis 0.043** 
crisis -1.3% crisis 23.4% crisis -0.334 crisis 0.74 
total -3.7% total 20.9% total -1.605 total 0.113 
 
12 
pre-crisis -4.4% pre-crisis 24.5% pre-crisis -1.164 pre-crisis 0.251 
crisis -2.0% crisis 22.4% crisis -0.546 crisis 0.589 
total -3.3% total 23.5% total -1.291  total 0.201 
 
18 
pre-crisis -4.9% pre-crisis 34.1% pre-crisis -0.94 pre-crisis 0.352 
crisis -3.7% crisis 20.6% crisis -1.082 crisis 0.286 
total -4.3% total 28.5% total -1.357 total 0.179 
 
24 
pre-crisis -5.2% pre-crisis 35.9% pre-crisis -0.953 pre-crisis 0.346 
crisis -1.5% crisis 24.4% crisis -0.374 crisis 0.711 
total -3.5% total 31% total -1.01 total 0.316 
 
30 
pre-crisis -0.2% pre-crisis 25.3% pre-crisis -0.052 pre-crisis 0.959 
crisis -0.4% crisis 27.8% crisis -0.096 crisis 0.924 
total -0.3% total 26.3% total -0.106 total 0.916 
 
36 
pre-crisis -3.5% pre-crisis 30.9% pre-crisis -0.749 pre-crisis 0.46 
crisis -4.4% crisis 35.3% crisis -0.751 crisis 0.457 
total -3.9% total 32.8% total -1.065 total 0.29 
significant at 5% level **, significant at 10% level * 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
The study has two main hypotheses: the first hypothesis tests whether the M&A transac-
tion create any statistically significant abnormal returns and the second hypothesis tests 
whether the M&A transactions are equally profitable or unprofitable during the both 
sub-periods. In the next table (table 11) the above introduced mean components from 
the two sub-periods are compared in order to find out whether there is a significant dif-
ference in profitability between two sub-periods. First column tells the return period, 
second names the used method (same method used for every return period), third col-
umn shows the number of the observations fourth column show the degrees of freedom 
(same for every test), and fifth and sixth columns show the results of statistical test. As 
the results of mean tests show there is no statistically significant difference in profitabil-
ity between two sub-periods. In conclusion it can be stated that there is no statistically 
significant difference in profitability between two sub-periods when wealth relatives are 
calculated as M&A companies compared with matching companies and hence the re-
sults support the second hypothesis. 
  
Figure 6. Mean components: M&A companies/matching companies 
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Table 11. Mean components of M&A companies/matching companies between two sub-periods 
Month Method N Degrees of 
freedom 
t-value p-value 
6 t-test 80 78 0.977 0.331 
12 t-test 80 78 0.443 0.659 
18 t-test 80 78 0.191 0.849 
24 t-test 80 78 0.32 0.596 
30 t-test 80 78 -0.040 0.968 
36 t-test 80 78 -0.113 0.910 
significant at 5% level **, significant at 10% level * 
 
 
Previous analyses considered the wealth relatives of the M&A companies compared 
with matching companies. Next this study conducts the same analyses but now the 
wealth relatives are calculated for M&A companies compared with market index. 
Wealth relatives of M&A companies compared with market index are decomposed into 
mean and volatility components, and the interpretations about profitability are made 
according to mean components. Column 1 in table 12 show the used holding period, 
column 2 show the calculated mean components and, column 3 show the standard devi-
ation of the returns and columns 4 and 5 show the results of statistical tests. In addition 
the columns from two to five are divided into three groups in order to find out how the 
profitability changes between three different analyzed periods (pre-crisis, crisis, and 
whole period).  
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Table 12. Mean components: M&A companies/market index 
Month Mean 
component 
Standard 
deviation 
t-value p-value 
 
6 
pre-crisis -2.3% pre-crisis 17.6% pre-crisis -0.839 pre-crisis 0.406 
crisis 1.6% crisis 23.5% crisis 0.415 crisis 0.681 
total -0.5% total 20.5% total -0.205 total 0.838 
 
12 
pre-crisis -0.3% pre-crisis 23% pre-crisis -0.099 pre-crisis 0.921 
crisis 2.0% crisis 21% crisis 0.581 crisis 0.565 
total 0.7% total 22% total 0.301 total 0.764 
 
18 
pre-crisis -0.2% pre-crisis 28.8% pre-crisis -0.048 pre-crisis 0.962 
crisis 3.5% crisis 21.3% crisis 1.003 crisis 0.322 
total 1.5% total 25.5% total 0.531 total 0.597 
 
24 
pre-crisis 1.2% pre-crisis 31.4% pre-crisis 0.243 pre-crisis 0.810 
crisis 4.1% crisis 23.5% crisis 1.069 crisis 0.292 
total 2.5% total 27.9% total 0.813 total 0.419 
 
30 
pre-crisis 5.3% pre-crisis 22.5% pre-crisis 1.555 pre-crisis 0.128 
crisis 6.2% crisis 26.8% crisis 1.416 crisis 0.166 
total 5.8%** total 24.4% total 2.106** total 0.038** 
 
36 
pre-crisis 2.5% pre-crisis 27% pre-crisis 0.617 pre-crisis 0.541 
crisis 3.7% crisis 30.4% crisis 0.736 crisis 0.467 
total 3.1% total 28.4% total 0.964 total 0.338 
significant at 5% level **, significant at 10% level * 
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Results of the table 12 and figure 7 show that mean components calculated from the 
wealth relatives M&A companies compared with market index, are mainly positive. 
Mean components have been positive almost all the time when pre-crisis and total ana-
lyzed period is considered. If M&A companies underperformed compared with match-
ing companies, now they outperform compared with market index. Despite the mean 
components were positive almost all the time they were statistically significant only 
ones (30 month holding period while the whole analyzed period is examined +5.8%). 
Again it is important to note the difference between pure wealth relative value and the 
volatility adjusted mean component value. Wealth relative value indicates around 7% 
outperformance of M&A companies compared with market index in the three years 
holding period. Volatility adjusted mean component however reveal that the outperfor-
mance was just around 3%. Volatility adjusted mean component can be accepted to de-
pict the reality better because the volatility component causes the positive bias in the 
wealth relative values.  
 
Aligned with the previously introduced tests, this study conduct also the mean differ-
ence test for these mean components calculated from M&A companies compared with 
market index. Mean components were mostly positive in both sub-periods but in order 
to find out whether there is significant difference in profitability between two periods, 
Figure 7. Mean components: M&A companies/market index 
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the mean tests must be conducted. Columns include same factors as in table 11 but here 
the mean components are calculated from the wealth relatives of M&A companies com-
pared with market index. Column 1 includes the holding period, column 2 shows the 
used method, column 3 shows the number of observations, column 4 shows the degrees 
of freedom and columns 5 and 6 reveal the results from mean tests.  
 
 
Table 13. Mean components of M&A companies/market index between two sub-periods 
Month Method N Degrees of 
freedom 
t-value p-value 
6 t-test 80 78 0.837 0.405 
12 t-test 80 78 0.475 0.636 
18 t-test 80 78 0.650 0.518 
24 t-test 80 78 0.472 0.638 
30 t-test 80 78 0.166 0.869 
36 t-test 80 78 0.178 0.859 
significant at 5% level **, significant at 10% level * 
 
Comparison of the profitabilities between two sub-periods reveals that there is no statis-
tically significant difference in profitability between two-sub periods. Any of the test 
values is not even close to critical values. These findings support the second hypothesis 
because there seems not to be difference in profitabilities between two sub-periods. 
 
6.2.3. Summary of the long-term results and suggested explanations 
 
The first hypothesis of the thesis is: Mergers and acquisitions did not create any signifi-
cant abnormal returns for shareholders, not in short- and neither in the long-run. In 
contrast with short-term results it can be stated that findings support the first hypothesis 
when the long-term profitability is analyzed. Long-term profitability of the M&A trans-
actions calculated by wealth relative method did not create any significant abnormal 
returns. Companies which made M&A transactions underperformed compared with 
matching companies and outperformed compared with market index. However the re-
sults could not be accepted to be statistically significant.  
 
Many previous studies have stated that M&A transactions are wealth decreasing trans-
actions for the shareholders of the acquiring company. Many previous studies have used 
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data from US or UK. However, at least one study by Koskinen (2010) is conducted with 
Finnish data and the results show that M&A transactions really are wealth decreasing 
transactions in the long-term. Jakobsen & Voetman (2003) have studied the long-term 
profitability of the Danish companies M&A transactions. Their study takes the statisti-
cal issues and the Fama’s (1998) the bad model problem into account and the results 
show that actually the M&A transactions are not as poor transactions as could be ex-
pected. This study aims to take the statistical issues and the bad model problem also into 
account and the results are aligned with Jakobsen & Voetman (2003). Despite the un-
derperformance compared with matching companies was not statistically significant, the 
results are party aligned with the theory of managerial hubris by Roll (1986). Underper-
formance of M&A companies indicates that acquiring companies end to bid too high 
price and the result is that the expected synergies cannot be achieved in the long-term.  
 
The second hypothesis of the thesis is: There is no difference in profitability of mergers 
and acquisitions made before and during the crisis. Results suggest that there was no 
statistically significant difference in profitability between two analyzed periods in the 
long-term and hence the findings support the second hypothesis of the thesis. Despite 
the results were not statistically significant it can be stated that underperformance com-
pared with matching companies was smaller during the crisis period than pre-crisis pe-
riod. In addition outperformance compared with market index was also bigger during 
the crisis period than during the pre-crisis period. These results indicate that there could 
be some difference in investments’ profitability between different periods. Hence the 
managerial discretion theory by Jensen (1986) can partly be attributed to the long-term 
analyze also. Companies seem to make more profitable investments during the chal-
lenging times when the extra cash flows are rare and every investment decision must be 
properly analyzed, although the profitability difference is not statistically significant.  
 
6.2.4. Additional tests: structural changes 
 
Above introduced results about short-term and long-term profitability gives a good pic-
ture how profitable the M&A transactions of Finnish companies’ have been. These re-
sults are comprehensive but for extra analysis this study tests whether the companies 
which have made M&A transactions have experienced structural changes in their sys-
tematic risk. Systematic risk is measured by beta coefficient. Study by Hackbarth and 
Morellec (2008) have studied the mergers and acquisitions’ impact on companies’ sys-
tematic risk and their conclusion is that actually the systematic risk (beta coefficients) of 
the acquirer companies decreased after the transactions.  
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In order to find out the possible structural changes in beta coefficients this study has run 
the cusum test for every company which has made M&A transaction during the ana-
lyzed period. Cusum (cumulative sum) test can be used in order to find out whether the 
analyzed coefficients have been constant under the investigation period. In this study 
the analyzed coefficients are the beta coefficients and the critical value for the possible 
structural change is 5%.  
 
Results of the cusum tests reveal that the mergers and acquisitions did not change the 
risk characteristics of the companies. Only one regression from 80 cusum test regres-
sions resulted in extreme variation in beta coefficient and hence the significant structur-
al change.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Investing and extending the business is crucial for companies in order they survive and 
can maintain profitable business in the future. Companies can grow and extend their 
business by organic growth or by mergers and acquisitions with already existing com-
panies. The main motive behind the mergers and acquisitions is the synergy effect. Con-
solidation of the two companies can be managed by more effective way and the result-
ing synergy effects mean that one plus one results more than two. Existing studies relat-
ed on mergers and acquisitions are at least ambiguous. According to previous studies it 
is not clear whether mergers and acquisitions are wealth increasing or decreasing trans-
actions. Findings from previous studies are interesting because Modigliani & Miller 
(1958) have stated that companies should only take part in transactions which increase 
the shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Most of the previous studies are conducted with US or UK data. General conclusion 
from these previous studies is that mergers and acquisitions are wealth increasing trans-
actions for the target companies’ shareholders but negative or at least neutral for acquir-
ing company’s shareholders. US and UK studies’ strength is that they concentrate on 
the M&As’ effects on actively traded and large stock exchanges. However it is also in-
teresting to find out whether the same results can be found from smaller and not so ac-
tively traded stock exchanges. Study by Jakobsen & Voetman (2003) have examined the 
M&A transactions’ profitability with Danish data and their results suggest that actually 
the mergers and acquisitions are not as bad transactions for shareholders as the previous 
literature suggest.  
 
Fama (1991) has introduced the bad model problem. The main idea behind this Fama’s 
statement is that generally every anomaly in financial markets is the result of used 
methodology. Bad model problem is important when mergers and acquisitions are ex-
amined, because especially long-term studies are prone to this bad model problem. Bad 
model problem leads into biased results and the bias grows when the examined period is 
extended. Event study methodology is useful method for short-term studies but for long-
term studies the used methodology must be considered properly. Jakobsen & Voetman 
(2003) have used the wealth relative method for long-term analyze. Wealth relative 
method should remove the biases which arise from new listing bias, rebalancing bias, 
and skewness bias. Hence the wealth relative method is used in this study also.  
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Previous studies of mergers and acquisitions have not taken the recent financial crisis 
impact into account. In addition there are not many studies conducted with Finnish data. 
Statistics show that merger and acquisition activity and the absolute value of the trans-
actions decreased during the recent financial crisis. Financial crisis clearly seems to 
have impact on merger and acquisition activity. However it is not clear whether the cri-
sis period has impact on transactions profitability. Actually the crisis period’s impact to 
transactions’ profitability may have positive, because according to managerial discretion 
theory by Jensen (1986), companies may make worse investment decisions during extra 
cash flow. In conclusion it would be expected that during the more challenging times 
companies make more profitable investment decisions because every investment must 
be properly analyzed.  
 
Based on the introduced theories and previous literature this study tries to find out 
whether the mergers and acquisitions are wealth increasing, decreasing or wealth neutral 
transactions for the acquiring company’s shareholders. M&As’ impact is analyzed for 
both, short- and long-, terms. In addition this study tries to find out whether the finan-
cial crisis had impact on the mergers and acquisitions’ wealth creation. Based on these 
research problems this study has two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Mergers and acquisitions did not create any significant abnormal returns for 
shareholders, not in short- and neither in the long-run.  
 
H2: There is no difference in profitability of mergers and acquisitions before and during 
the crisis.  
 
According to empirical results Finnish companies’ M&A transactions are not as bad 
transactions are the previous literature would suggest. Actually the mergers and acquisi-
tions created even positive abnormal returns (+2.5 %) in the short-term when the event 
window was -1:+1 days. Results do not support the first hypothesis and suggest that 
prices of Finnish stock exchange reflect the new information quite fast, because the ab-
normal effect seems to vanish when the event window was extended to -15:+15 days. 
Used event study methodology can be accepted to be appropriate method for short-term 
studies. Short-term results indicate that investors expect that companies which take part 
in mergers and acquisitions are actually able to achieve the expected efficiency increase 
and synergy effects.  
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Long-term results reveal that Finnish companies’ M&A transactions were not wealth 
decreasing neither wealth increasing transactions but wealth neutral transactions for 
shareholders. Long-term performance is analyzed with the wealth relative method and 
absolute results reveal that M&A companies underperform compared with matching 
companies and outperform compared with market index. However any of the results 
were not statistically significant and hence the results suggest that M&A transactions’ 
impact on shareholders’ wealth would be neutral . Despite the underperformance of the 
Finnish companies’ mergers and acquisitions was not statistically significant, the results 
show that underperformance was constant through the all examined holding periods.  
This indicates that companies may suffer of too high bidding prices. This explanation is 
aligned with the managerial hubris theory by Roll (1986) which suggests that acquiring 
companies end to bid too high price for the target company and the result is that the 
expected efficiency increase and synergy effects are not met in the long-term.  
 
Empirical analysis between two sub-periods reveal that M&A companies performed 
slightly better during the crisis period that during the pre-crisis period. Results are simi-
lar for both short- and long-term holding periods. However the differences were not 
statistically significant and hence the results support the second hypothesis. Better re-
sults from crisis period however indicate that companies may make more profitable in-
vestments during the more challenging times. These results are partly aligned with man-
agerial discretion theory by Jensen (1986) which states that companies are prone to 
make poor investments during good and extra cash flow periods.  
 
Merger and acquisition profitability of Finnish companies is not very widely examined 
topic in finance research. This study’s contribution for existing literature is that Finnish 
companies M&A transactions are not wealth decreasing neither wealth increasing but 
merely wealth neutral transactions for the shareholders. These results are interesting 
because they are mostly opposite compared with previous studies from bigger stock 
exchanges like US or UK. Results are even more comprehensive after the analyzed pe-
riod is divided into two sub-periods. Financial crisis impact on Finnish companies 
M&A transactions is very new topic and hence this study can be seen to be quite unique 
in the field of this area. Keeping in mind the bad model problem by Fama (1991) it can 
be concluded that Finnish companies are able to avoid the wealth decrease from mer-
gers and acquisitions and in addition the Finnish companies are able to maintain the 
stable investment profitability during the various economic states.  
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The biggest limitation of this study relate on the quite small amount of data. Small 
amount of data is one possible source of the biased returns. This small data problem 
must be kept in mind when the results of this study are analyzed. Another possible limi-
tation relates on the used methodology. Despite the wealth relative method should re-
move the biggest sources of biased results, the long-term studies are always prone to 
possible biases like skewness, rebalancing, and new listing.  
 
First recommendation for future research is that M&A transactions’ profitability could 
be examined with various methods. Methodology issue seems to be very important as-
pect in financial studies and hence it would be interesting to find out whether the results 
with Finnish data are same if various methods are applied. Second recommendation 
relates on the companies characteristics. It would be very interesting to find out whether 
the companies from different industries perform better in mergers and acquisitions than 
others.   
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